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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are increasingly
being connected to corporate networks which has dramatically expanded their attack
surface to remote cyber attack. Adversaries are targeting these systems with increasing
frequency and sophistication. This thesis seeks to answer the research question
addressing which Information Assurance (IA) controls are most significant for network
defenders and SCADA system managers/operators to focus on in order to increase the
security of critical infrastructure systems against a Stuxnet-like cyber attack. This
research applies the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) IA controls to
an attack tree modeled on a remote Stuxnet-like cyber attack against the WPAFB fuels
operation. The probability of adversary success of specific attack scenarios is developed
via the attack tree. Then an impact assessment is obtained via a survey of WPAFB fuels
operation subject matter experts (SMEs). The probabilities of adversary success and
impact analysis are used to create a Risk Level matrix, which is analyzed to identify
recommended IA controls. The culmination of this research identified 14 IA controls
associated with mitigating an adversary from gaining remote access and deploying an
exploit as the most influential for SCADA managers, operators and network defenders to
focus on in order to maximize system security against a Stuxnet-like remote cyber attack.
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EVALUATING INFORMATION ASSURANCE CONTROL
EFFECTIVENESS ON AN AIR FORCE SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA
ACQUISITION (SCADA) SYSTEM

I. Introduction
The frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure continues
to escalate. A complex computer worm discovered in June 2010 effectively disabled Iran‟s
nuclear program for more than a year (Barnes, 2010). The highly secure Iranian nuclear
facilities were located underground, physically and electromagnetically isolated from insecure
networks, also known as air gapped from the Internet. It is suspected that the worm propagated
from universal serial bus (USB) thumb drives that technicians carried in and out of the facility
which closed the air gap and allowed the worm to penetrate the SCADA system. The highly
complex computer worm, called Stuxnet, was designed to jump from computer to computer until
it found a specific control system that it targeted (Barnes, 2010). Computer experts examining
the worm have described it as the first weaponized computer virus. According to Ralph Lagner,
the computer expert who first sounded the alarm about Stuxnet, it is “like the arrival of an F-35
into a World War I battlefield” (Barnes, 2010).
According to Warden (1998), when applying his five-ring system model of the adversary
it is imperative to approach the enemy as an interdependent system versus an opposing army,
navy and air force. The concentric rings of his model point to the relative importance as they
radiate out from the center which contains the leadership, see Figure 1. Critical infrastructures
fall within the second, system essentials ring and third, infrastructure ring of the five-ring
1

systems model, making them relatively more important than population and fielded military
(Warden, 1998). Modern societies and militaries have become increasingly dependent on critical
infrastructure such as electrical power generation/distribution, petroleum refining/distribution,
telecommunications. These critical infrastructures also form a critical vulnerability to the
industries that make modern societies and economies flourish. They also provide the logistical
support to allow a nation to successfully prosecute war.

Figure 1. Warden’s Five Rings (Warden, 1995)

Background
The systems that control critical infrastructures are Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
which encompass several types of control systems including Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other smaller control
systems such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (Stouffer, Falco & Scarfone, 2008).
Industries associated with critical infrastructure include power generation and distribution, oil
and gasoline refining and distribution, water and waste systems, chemical processing and
transport, manufacturing, telecommunications, and banking infrastructures (Munro, 2008). In
2

the past, these systems were isolated from corporate networks and the Internet, which insulated
them from remote cyber attacks and provided security through obscurity. However, these
systems are increasingly being connected to corporate networks in order to increase operating
efficiencies and reduce costs (Stouffer et al., 2008). Also, open source technical information on
SCADA systems is readily available to attackers (Stouffer et al., 2008). This has dramatically
increased the attack surface of SCADA systems to remote cyber attack. Note: Throughout this
thesis, Industrial Control Systems will be referred to as Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for consistency.
SCADA systems typically require high system availability due to the safety of ongoing
industrial processes. Disruption of system processes can cause an enormous negative financial
impact and even potential for loss of life. Because of the critical nature of these systems they are
prime targets for terrorists, or a nation state adversary, especially during wartime. According to
a MacAfee survey of over six hundred IT executives, the majority, 59% believe that foreign
governments are already involved in cyber attacks against their critical infrastructure (Baker,
Waterman & Ivanov, 2010). Additionally 80% of the respondents acknowledge connecting their
SCADA systems to an IP network despite the risks. Finally, the survey also revealed that less
than 50% of the critical infrastructure providers implement basic security measures (Baker et al.,
2010). The MacAfee report highlights the widespread vulnerability of critical infrastructures
world-wide. There is significant room for improvement in securing SCADA systems from cyber
attack. The federal government has recognized it has an important role to ensure critical
infrastructures are protected. The federal government has developed policies and partnerships
with private industry in an effort to secure critical infrastructures through a number of executive
orders, laws, and plans.
3

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-82
describe Information Assurance (IA) controls that apply to information systems in support of the
Federal government. These IA controls are the management, operational, and technical controls
that are considered industry best practices and government recommendations and guidance.
They serve to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
information. IA controls are the primary means through which SCADA systems are made
defensively strong to withstand cyber attacks. NIST recommends a defense-in-depth approach
of layering IA controls in order to achieve an effective cyber security posture (Stouffer et al.,
2008). The defense-in-depth approach employs successive layers of policy, operational
procedures and technology in a variety of methods to secure systems to achieve multilayer,
multidimensional protection, like the defenses of a medieval castle (Ashley & Jackson, 1999).
Research Goals
Current literature does not show an indication of the degree to which IA controls increase
the security of SCADA systems. My research will apply NIST IA controls in an attack tree to
evaluate the effectiveness of the IA controls. Attack trees are graphically represented by an upside down tree with the root node as the overall goal of the attack (Schneier, 1999). Sub goals
and leaf nodes provide different paths to the root. The cyber attack is based on the recent
Stuxnet exploit (Mills, 2010). The attack tree model is based on the Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (WPAFB) fuels operation. This operation is a small, government owned, contractor
operated Air Force base fuels operation. According to the Fuels flight contract branch chief, the
WPAFB fuels operation represents 70% of the Air Force fuels flight implementations in the
CONUS. Air Force Fuels Policy Directive 08-002, dated 10 November 2008 directs
implementation of fuels Automated Information Technology (AIT) hardware and software
4

(Hession, 2008). The Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) SCADA system is operated and
maintained by nearly all of the CONUS AF fuels operations (DLA, 2009). By examining the
probability of adversary success of specific attack scenarios along with WPAFB fuels operation
subject matter experts (SMEs) impact assessment, an overall risk is produced which highlights
the most significant groups of IA controls which contribute to increased security.
This research seeks to answer the research question: Which group of NIST 800-82 IA
controls are most significant for network defenders and SCADA system managers/operators to
focus on in order to increase the security of the WPAFB Fuels flight critical infrastructure
systems against a Stuxnet-like remote attack? Since Stuxnet is currently recognized as the most
advanced exploit against critical infrastructure, this research is timely in order to identify IA
controls which are most effective to mitigate a Stuxnet-like attack.
Thesis Organization
The purpose of this thesis is to determine which group of IA Controls are most effective
to mitigate a particular type of cyber attack against an Air Force fuels operation. The
introduction provided background material, established the research goals and introduced the
research question. Chapter 2 provides background on critical infrastructures and related
research. It describes SCADA systems along with polices that govern their security. It
compares and contrasts SCADA systems with traditional information technology systems and
describes recent cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. Additionally, this chapter provides
background on attack trees and explains how they function. Finally, it introduces the Stuxnet
exploit. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology. It describes what data was collected and
how the data was used. Also, how the results will be analyzed. Chapter 4 presents the analysis
of the data. Critical aspects of a risk matrix are examined and the most influential IA controls
5

are identified. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, recommendations for future work and
limitations to this approach.

6

"Throughout the Entire Course of History, Warfare is Always Changing." --Andre Beaufre

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on SCADA systems in
general and review previous research in the area of SCADA systems. Also, it provides
information on the Stuxnet worm, IA Controls, Fault trees, and Attack Trees.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Overview
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) encompass several types of control systems including
SCADA systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other smaller control system
components such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (Stouffer et al., 2008). Figure 2
shows a high level view of a typical SCADA system architecture.
SCADA systems are defined as a collection of systems, software and equipment that
allows an operator in a remote location to maintain situational awareness and exert control of
portions of, or an entire, industrial operation (Carlson, 2002). SCADA systems were designed to
enable control of large scale industrial processes and provide a means for their safe and efficient
operation and delivery (Munro, 2008). SCADA systems are typically geographically dispersed
and contain many data collection points. As an example, eighty percent of the United States‟
power is generated by 270 utilities. Each utility has its own SCADA system that contains up to
50,000 telemetry collection points (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005). In some cases, the number
of data collection points are in the 100,000 range, and a few instances near 1 million (Daneels
and Salter, 1999).
7

Figure 2. High level view of SCADA system Architecture (Stouffer et al., 2008)

These systems typically require total and absolute system availability (Gold, 2009).
Absolute system availability is required due to the safety of ongoing industrial processes.
Disruption of these processes can also cause enormous negative financial impacts and even
potential for loss of life. For instance, a large gas line explosion would cost the parent company
financial loss and also has the potential for human injury or death, depending on the location
(Carmody, Hammerschmidt, Goglia & Black, 2002). For instance, on 20 September 2010, a gas
line explosion in San Bruno, California killed 6 peoples and destroyed 30 homes (HennessyFiske, 2010). Also, on 19 January 2011, an explosion of a gas line in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
killed one person, injured five and burned two homes (Stamm, 2011). The underlying cause of
both explosions are still under investigation as of this writing.
Many industries utilize SCADA systems. Some of these industries include power
generation and distribution, oil and gasoline refining and distribution, water and waste systems,
chemical processing and transport, manufacturing, telecommunications, and banking
infrastructures (Munro, 2008). They form centers of gravity for societies and governments.
8

According to the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms (2010), a center of gravity is the source of
power that provides a nation the moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act
(Mullen, 2010). They provide the life blood for modern societies to operate efficiently. Indeed,
critical infrastructures form a center of gravity for the U.S. Approximately 90 percent of the
U.S. critical infrastructure is owned by private companies (Stouffer et al., 2008).
A great deal of SCADA systems in operation today were installed 15 to 20 years ago,
when attack threats were more physical (Gold, 2009). Information security was not a significant
concern when most SCADA systems were initially installed. Today these networks are
threatened electronically when they are connected to a corporate network, which is typically
connected to the Internet.
Government Role in SCADA security
The U.S. government has recognized the important role that critical infrastructures play
in the functioning of government, the economy, and society in general. The federal government
has a responsibility in ensuring these infrastructures are protected. It has taken steps, in the form
of policy and regulation, to facilitate increased security of these critical systems. The next
several sub-paragraphs present in chronological order many of these policies and other initiatives
the U.S. government has taken to facilitate critical infrastructure security.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
On 15 July 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010. The purpose of this
order was to develop a strategy to protect critical infrastructures. The order established the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), and a number of
associated committees, whose mission was to examine the problem of securing critical
infrastructures. The Infrastructure Protection Task Force (IPTF) was also established to identify
9

and coordinate existing expertise in the public and private sector. The PCCIP along with related
committees and the IPTF were all temporary in nature and terminated on or before seven months
after the executive order was signed (Clinton, 1996).
Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63
On 22 May 1998 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 62 and
63. Both seek to strengthen the nation‟s defenses. The directives dealt with emerging
unconventional threats and protection of U.S. critical infrastructure. A key tie-in between the
two, described in PDD-62 is the establishment of the office of the National Coordinator for
Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The two sections below provide
additional details of the two PDDs.
Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure
On 22 May 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 to
further address critical infrastructure protection. PDD-63 clearly identified critical
infrastructures as physical and cyber systems that are essential to the minimal operations of both
the economy and government (Clinton, 1998). Additionally, the directive identified
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency
services, both governmental and private as examples of critical infrastructure sectors. The intent
of this document was to ensure that the United States would take necessary steps to eliminate
significant vulnerabilities to critical infrastructures, with an emphasis on cyber systems. PDD-63
also emphasized that the protection of critical infrastructures is a shared responsibility and
partnership between the commercial entities and the government. Finally, the directive
designated lead agencies for 15 specific sectors and functions of critical infrastructure.

10

Combating Terrorism
On 22 May 1998, President Clinton also signed PDD 62, “Protection against
Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas”, which reaffirms PDD-63
vs. policy on Counter Terrorism. This classified document creates a more systematic approach
to fighting the terrorist threat. It clarifies the activities of many U.S. agencies charged with roles
in defeating terrorism. In order to achieve a heightened level of coordination, it also established
the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism (Clinton, 1998).
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001
Section 1016 of the Patriot Act is referred to as the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act
of 2001. It establishes the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to
serve as the source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and
continuity. The act also further clarified the definitions of critical infrastructures as:
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters (Bush, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age
On 16 October 2001 President Bush signed Executive Order 13231, Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. EO 13231 established the President‟s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. The board is responsible for recommending policies and
coordinating programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including
emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems
(Bush, 2001).
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Patriot Act of 2001
On 26 October 2001, the Patriot Act of 2001 was approved by President Bush. The
Patriot Act of 2001 significantly increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to search
telephone and e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records. Additionally, it
eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States and broadened the
discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants
suspected of terrorism-related acts. Finally, the act expanded the definition of terrorism to
include domestic terrorism (Bush, 2001).
National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002
In July 2002, President Bush published the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. This was the first document of its kind. The purpose of the Strategy was to
mobilize and organize in order to secure the nation form terrorist attacks. It laid out three
priorities: 1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 2) Reduce America‟s
vulnerability to terrorism, and 3) Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do
occur (Bush, 2002).
National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
In February 2003, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets was signed by President Bush. It seeks to facilitate the strategic
planning process for core mission areas and reduce the nation‟s vulnerability by protecting our
critical infrastructures and key assets from physical attack. It aligns homeland security efforts
into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security,
domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructures and key assets, defending against
catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response. It also provides a unified
12

organizational structure and identified specific initiatives to protect critical infrastructures (Bush,
2003).
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
On 17 December, 2003 the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 was signed by
President Bush. It established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify
and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from terrorist attacks. It defines terms
and asserts 31 policy statements. These policy statements provide additional detail of and define
the roles various federal, state, and local agencies will play in carrying out the directive (Bush,
2003). See Appendix A for listing of Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal
Agencies.
National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007
In October 2007, an updated National Strategy for Homeland Security was published by
President Bush. It addressed safeguarding and preserving the nation‟s Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources (CIKR). The Strategy builds directly from the first National Strategy for
Homeland Security published in 2002. This updated Strategy incorporates lessons learned from
exercises and real-world catastrophes. It also complements the National Security Strategy and
the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, both published in 2006. The purpose of the
strategy is to guide, organize, and unify U.S. homeland security efforts on four goals: 1) prevent
and disrupt terrorist attacks, 2) protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key
resources, 3) respond to and recover from incidents that do occur, and 4) continue to strengthen
the foundation to ensure long-term success. Table 1 identifies 17 sectors of critical infrastructure
and key resources established by the 2007 strategy.
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Table 1. 17 Sectors of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (Bush, 2007), (Bush, 2003)
Sectors of Critical Infrastructure
and Key resources
Agriculture and Food

Banking and Finance

*Chemical

*Commercial Facilities
*Commercial Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste
*Dams
Defense Industrial Base
Drinking Water and Water
Treatment Systems
Emergency Services
Energy
Government Facilities
Information Technology
*National Monuments and Icons
Postal and Shipping

Public Health and Health Care

Telecommunications

Transportation Systems

Description
The supply chains for feed, animals, and animal products; Crop
production and the supply chains of seed, fertilizer, and other necessary
related materials; and post-harvesting components.
Variety of physical structures, to include buildings and financial
utilities, as well as human capital. Also payment, clearing and
settlement systems and electronic and physical transfer of assets.
Manufactures of products such as fertilizer, chlorine, and polymers.
Depends on raw materials, manufacturing plants and processes, and
distribution systems, research facilities, transportation and electricity.
Commercial centers, office buildings, sports stadiums, theme parks, and
other sites where large numbers of people congregate to pursue
business activities, conduct commercial transactions, or recreation.
Robust containment buildings, redundant safety systems,
and sheltered spent fuel storage facilities.
Larger Dams provide water and electricity to cities, and agriculture.
The federal government is responsible for roughly 10 percent of the
dams whose failure could cause significant property damage or have
public health and safety consequences.
Private industries supporting the DOD.
Fresh water supply and wastewater collection and treatment. These
utilities depend on reservoirs, dams, wells, and aquifers, treatment
facilities, pumping stations, aqueducts, and transmission pipelines.
Fire, rescue, emergency medical service, and law enforcement
organizations that are employed to save lives and property in the event
of an accident, natural disaster, or terrorist incident.
Generation, production, distribution and command and control of
electricity and oil and natural gas.
Federally owned or operated facilities, including DOD and the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
Information systems, networks, Communication systems, Internet,
facilities, human and intellectual capital, networks, communications
lines, infrastructures and IT services.
Diverse array of national monuments, symbols, and icons that represent
our Nation‟s heritage, traditions and values, and political power.
Depends on a transportation fleet composed of both service-owned and
contractor-operated vehicles and equipment. Mail also travels daily by
commercial aircraft, truck, railroad, and ship.
State and local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mental
health facilities, nursing homes, blood-supply facilities, laboratories,
mortuaries, and pharmaceutical stockpiles.
Provides voice and data service to public and private users through a
complex and diverse public-network infrastructure encompassing the
Public Switched Telecommunications Network (PSTN), the Internet,
and private enterprise networks.
Aviation, maritime traffic, rail, pipelines, highways,
trucking and busing, and public mass transit.

* Denotes sectors added by 2007 Strategy
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National Infrastructure Protection Plan
In 2009, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was signed by Michael
Chertoff. It seeks to make U.S. critical infrastructures and key resources more resilient to
disruption. The NIPP also lays out a risk management framework which enables risk-informed
decision making to mitigate effects of terrorist attacks through risk management actions. It also
contains the most current mapping of sector-specific agency to critical infrastructure sector.
Table 2 provides a mapping of government agency to critical infrastructure (Chertoff, 2009).
Table 2. Government agency to Critical Infrastructure mapping (Chertoff, 2009)
Sector-Specific Agency
Department of Agriculture
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Interior
Department of the Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
Transportation Security Administration
Transportation Security Administration
United States Coast Guard
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Federal Protective Service

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources sector
Agriculture and Food
Defense Industrial Base
Energy
Healthcare and Public Health
National Monuments and Icons
Banking and Finance
Water
Chemical Commercial Facilities, Critical
Manufacturing, Dams, Emergency Services, Nuclear
reactors, Materials, and waste
Information Technology Communications
Postal and Shipping
Transportation Systems
Government Facilities

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
On January 14, 2010, DOD Directive (DODD) 3020.40 established the Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program (DCIP). It established the responsibilities of the DOD, pursuant to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and the National Industrial Security Program DODD
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5220.22 of 2004. The DCIP sought to align DOD efforts in support of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. DCIP contains DOD sector-specific agency responsibilities for
the national Defense Industrial Base (DIB) sector (Lynn, 2010).
Summary of Government Role in SCADA security
The U.S. government has recognized the important role that critical infrastructures play
in the functioning of government, the economy, and society in general. The previous sections
described a number of steps it has taken via policy and regulation to facilitate increased security
of critical infrastructures. These extensive efforts by the federal government highlight the
relevance of this research on the effectiveness of IA controls. The next section compares and
contrasts characteristics of SCADA and IT systems.
Comparing SCADA and IT systems
Information Technology (IT) and SCADA systems were built for different purposes and
are governed by different core principles. When SCADA systems were created, the primary
concern was for reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) (Byres et al., 2003).
SCADA systems were created to support critical infrastructure control processes. Security was
considered from the standpoint of physical security, consisting of closed systems with controlled
access to the network and consoles. This method required attackers to have access and be able to
come in physical contact with the equipment they were attempting to affect. In contrast, IT
systems‟ core principles are confidentially, integrity and availability (CIA) (Bishop, 2003). See
Figure 3 for graphical representation of RMA and CIA core principals. Computers were
originally networked together to support research efforts. Now the Internet is primarily used for
communications, information, commerce and entertainment.
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Figure 3. RMA and CIA core principles (Byres et al., 2003), (Bishop, 2003)

Perhaps the most significant differences between SCADA and IT networks are their
requirements for availability, latency, and security. IT network users tolerate periodic outages
where service is not available. However, SCADA systems are required to operate uninterrupted
for months and in some cases years (Byres and Lowe, 2004). Furthermore, IT systems typically
operate with considerable variation in communication path latency. However, SCADA systems
cannot tolerate increased latency due to proprietary protocols and safety requirements for timely
human interaction (Byres and Lowe, 2004). Another significant difference between the two is
illustrated with the end devices. In an IT network there is a high tolerance for periodic end
device, ie. computer outages. There is a greater concern of keeping the core network servers
operating in the network operations center. In SCADA systems, however, the end device is
extremely important in that it provides telemetry to the central facility. If telemetry is not
available, then serious problems can arise (Byres and Lowe, 2004). Since SCADA systems are
now being connected to IT networks the security vulnerabilities inherent to SCADA systems can
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now be exploited via the IT network. Table 3 summarizes some of the differences between IT
systems and SCADA systems.
Table 3. Differences between IT and SCADA systems (Stouffer et al., 2008)
Characteristic

IT System

SCADA System

Performance Requirements

Non-real-time
Response must be consistent
High throughput is demanded
High delay and jitter maybe acceptable

Real-time
Response is time-critical
Modest throughput is acceptable
High delay and/or jitter is a serious concern

Availability Requirements

Responses such as rebooting are acceptable
Availability deficiencies can often be
tolerated

Rebooting may not be acceptable
Outages must be planned and scheduled well in advance
Exhaustive pre-deployment testing required

Risk Management Requirements

Confidentiality and integrity is paramount
Fault tolerance is less important –
momentary downtime is not a major risk
Delay of business operations is major risk

Human safety paramount, followed by process protection
Fault tolerance is essential, downtime not acceptable
Major risk impact is regulatory non-compliance, loss of
life, equipment, or production

Architecture Security Focus

Primary focus is protecting the IT assets,
and the information stored on or transmitted
Central server may require more protection

Primary goal is to protect edge clients (e.g., field devices
such as process controllers)
Protection of central server is still important

Unintended Consequences

Security solutions are designed around
typical IT systems

Security tools must be tested to ensure that they do not
compromise normal ICS operation

Time-Critical Interaction

Less critical emergency interaction
Tightly restricted access control can be
implemented to the degree necessary

Response to human, other emergency interaction is critical
Access to ICS should be strictly controlled, yet not hamper
human-machine interaction

System Operation

Systems are designed for use with typical
operating systems
Upgrades are straightforward

Differing and custom operating systems often without
security capabilities
Software changes must be carefully made

Resource Constraints

Systems are specified with enough
resources to support the addition of thirdparty applications such as security solutions

Systems are designed to support the intended industrial
process, with minimal memory and computing resources to
support the addition of security technology

Communications

Standard communications protocols
Mostly wired networks with some wireless
Typical IT networking practices

Many proprietary and standard communication protocols
Many types of comm. media used including wire/wireless
Complex networks, require expertise of control engineers

Change Management

applied in a timely fashion in the presence
of good security policy and procedures. The
Procedures are often automated.

Must be thoroughly tested and deployed incrementally
throughout a system. ICS outages must be scheduled
days/weeks in advance

Managed Support

Diversified support styles

Usually single vendor

Component Lifetime

3-5 years

15-20 years

Access to Components

local and easy to access

isolated, remote, and require extensive physical effort to
gain access to them

With such significant differences among the key characteristics of IT and SCADA
systems, it follows that joining the two together in a networked environment may lead to
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negative consequences. One consequence is unintentionally exposing SCADA systems to
exploitation and electronic attack.
Risk Factors
There are several factors which increase the risk associated with SCADA systems. These
include: 1. standardized protocols and technologies, 2. connectivity to other networks, 3.
insecure and rogue connections, and 4. widespread availability of technical specifications
(Stouffer et al., 2008). These factors increase the attack surface of SCADA systems. They are
each discussed further in the next four sections.
Standardized Protocols and Technologies
Vendors are openly publishing their equipment specifications to allow third parties to
generate compatible add-ons. They are also transitioning from proprietary systems to open
systems to reduce cost and remain competitive. Increasing in popularity standard technologies
like Microsoft Windows® and common network protocols like TCP/IP. Standardized protocols
and networking technology vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques are widely published on
the Internet. The increased use of standard protocols increases the risk to SCADA systems
(Stouffer et al., 2008).
Connectivity to other networks
Many organizations have connected their SCADA systems to a corporate network in
order to improve ease of access to resources by operational personnel to conduct maintenance
and diagnostics. Connectivity to the SCADA system allows management to make operational
and purchasing decisions. Connecting the SCADA network to a corporate network exposes all
of the SCADA components to the corporate network. The corporate network in-turn has
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network connections to the Internet and in many cases other corporate partner networks as well.
An adversary can use these connections to attack the SCADA system (Stouffer et al., 2008).
Insecure and rogue connections
Modems are typically used by vendors to perform maintenance, diagnostics and system
health monitoring. These connection points introduce a significant risk to SCADA systems.
While modems provide great reach-back capability at significant cost savings, they also provide
an entry into the SCADA network. If the modem does not use an authentication scheme, it can
be easily exploited. In some cases, systems come pre-installed with modems that are configured
with a default password that is never changed (Stouffer et al., 2008). The same is true for some
wireless connections (Stouffer et al., 2008). Some wireless encryption is very weak and leave
networks susceptible to a determined hacker. Also, connections opened for vendors to do
temporary work are a risk, especially if they are forgotten about (Stouffer et al., 2008).
Additionally, hard-wired connections that do not have strong authentication and encryption can
also be easily breeched (Stouffer et al., 2008).
Widespread availability of technical specifications
Technical information for SCADA system components are widely available to the public
for free or purchase. This information aids industry professionals to maintain their expertise and
assists in development of future control systems. Anyone with access to the Internet can gain
specific technical information and in some cases operating manuals for vendor specific
equipment. With this widespread availability of information, it is possible for a determined
attacker who has little knowledge of SCADA systems to utilize automated attack tools against
them (Stouffer et al., 2008).
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Vulnerabilities of SCADA Systems
It is becoming increasingly common for critical infrastructure sectors to connect their
SCADA system to enterprise or corporate networks which inadvertently act as a gateway to the
Internet (Stouffer et al., 2008). The Internet connection provides another avenue for attackers
targeting SCADA systems. Since SCADA systems are connected to an IP network, they are
vulnerable to most of the IP exploits that hackers use. In addition to physical access and
connection to IP networks as attack vectors, SCADA systems are also vulnerable to attack
through telephone modems, wireless networks, laptop computers, and trusted vendor connections
(Byres et al., 2003). According to Ken Munro, managing director of SecureTest, they have
discovered a new vulnerability in every SCADA test they have conducted (Munro, 2008)1.
The Department of Homeland Security staged an experiment called Aurora in March
2007, at the Department of Energy‟s (DOE) Idaho Lab (Meserve, 2007). A video recording
demonstrated how a large industrial generator commonly deployed in the nation‟s power grid
could be destroyed by a remotely connected computer hacker. Multiple, simultaneous attacks
such as this could knock out power over a large geographical area for months, causing significant
harm to the U.S. economy. Scott Borg, an economist working on federal government projects,
stated that if a third of the country lost power for three months, it would cost $700 billion,
causing greater damage than the great depression (Meserve, 2007).
The DOE Aurora experiment demonstrated how an adversary can cause significant
damage to the power grid by cyber means with only a few lines of code. In a SCADA
environment, something as ordinarily mundane as a network scan can be enough to cause

1

SecureTest is a provider of expert penetration and security testing, with over 500 clients across the private,
public sectors (SecureTest, 2010).
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equipment to malfunction (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005). Unlike IT systems, which are
routinely patched as needed, SCADA systems are only patched every few years due to high
demand of availability (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005). SCADA systems are also highly
vulnerable to malformed packets, causing them to stop functioning, as compared to IT networks
which would merely discard them.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology‟s Guide to Industrial Control
Systems points out that vulnerabilities can exist in policy and procedures, platform configuration,
platform hardware, platform software, malware protection, network configuration vulnerabilities,
network hardware, network perimeter, network monitoring and logging, communications, and
wireless connections (Stouffer et al., 2008). In the past the hacker community lacked expertise
in exploiting SCADA systems. However now that SCADA systems can be reached from the
Internet, hackers will likely have interest in exploiting them.
In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security
Program (CSSP) issued a report titled “Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in
DHS Industrial Control Systems Assessments” that present the results from 15 ICS assessments
performed from 2004 through 2008. The purpose of the assessments was to provide information
to critical infrastructure providers on vulnerabilities, so they could increase the security of their
SCADA systems. Vulnerability information was collected and analyzed. Common
vulnerabilities were grouped into general categories. The analysis of the data collected found
that poor network protocol implementations, information disclosure, and authentication problems
occurred with the most frequency (DHS, 2009). Table 4 contains a listing of the common
vulnerabilities discovered from the assessments.
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Table 4. Summary of Common CSSP ICS assessment findings (DHS, 2009)
Category
Poor Code Quality
Vulnerable Web
Services

Common Vulnerability
Use of potentially dangerous functions in proprietary ICS application
Poor authentication
Directory traversal enabled
Unauthenticated access to Web server

Poor Network Protocol Lack of input validation: Buffer overflow in ICS service
Implementations
Lack of input validation: Lack of bounds checking in ICS Service
ICS protocol uses weak authentication
ICS protocol uses weak integrity checks
Poor Patch
Management

ICS product relies on standard IT protocol that uses weak encryption
Unpatched or old versions of third-party applications incorporated into ICS
software
Unpatched operating system

Weak Authentication

ICS uses standard IT protocol that uses weak encryption
Use of standard IT protocol with clear-text authentication
Client-side enforcement of server-side security
Improper security configuration
No password required
Weak passwords
Weak password requirements

Least User Privileges
Violation

Unauthorized directory traversal allowed

Services running with unnecessary privileges
Information Disclosure Unencrypted proprietary ICS protocol communication
Unencrypted nonproprietary ICS protocol communication
Unencrypted services common in IT systems
Open network shares on ICS hosts
Weak protection of user credentials
Information leak through unsecure service configuration
Network Design
Vulnerabilities

Lack of network segmentation

Network Component
Configuration
Vulnerabilities

Access to specific ports on host not restricted to required IP addresses

Firewall bypassed

Port Security not implemented on network equipment

ICS Security Controls
According to Stouffer et al. (2008), security controls are one of various security
mechanisms which when implemented correctly can impede an adversary by mitigating system
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vulnerabilities. Security controls consist of management, operational, and technical safeguards
or countermeasures put in place for an information system to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the system and its information (Ross, Stoneburner, Porter, Rogers,
Swanson, Graubart et al., 2007). Organizations need to determine which security controls are
needed to protect their information systems and operation. They must also determine the needed
level of assurance. These controls are measured when put in place to ensure they are providing
the protection desired. Security controls are recommended for use by organizations for
protecting their information systems and should be employed as part of a larger well-defined and
documented information security program (Ross et al., 2007). Table 5 lists the classes and
families of the 17 Security Controls.
Table 5. Security Control Families and Classes (Ross et al., 2007)
FAMILY

CLASS

Access Control

Technical

Awareness and Training

Operational

Audit and Accountability

Technical

Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments

Management

Configuration Management

Operational

Contingency Planning

Operational

Identification and Authentication

Technical

Incident Response

Operational

Maintenance

Operational

Media Protection

Operational

Physical and Environmental Protection

Operational

Planning

Management

Personnel Security

Operational

Risk Assessment

Management

System and Services Acquisition

Management

System and Communication Protection

Technical

System and Information Integrity

Operational

24

ICS specific security control guidance is found in Appendix I of NIST Special
Publication 800-53. It takes the guidance for IT systems and tailors it specifically for ICS.
These changes recognize the differences in ICS and IT systems and provide additional focus to
the need for real-time response and extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability
(Ross et al., 2007).
Threats to SCADA Systems
A threat is defined as an indication of imminent danger (Merriam-Webster, 2010).
SCADA systems are subject to threats similar to that of computer systems and
telecommunications networks. These threats can come from both electromagnetic and physical
means. Threats can come from people, natural disasters, accidents, and equipment failures
(DHS, 2005). Adversarial threats are a subset of threats consisting of people motivated to
negatively impact SCADA systems. Other forms of threats like natural disasters and equipment
failures are important to plan for in order to protect SCADA systems, but are not the focus of this
literature review. The adversarial threats along with their description and motivations are listed
in Table 6.
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Table 6. Adversarial Threats to ICSs and motivations (DHS, 2005), (Grimes, 2005)
Threat agent

Description

Remote Hacking once required a fair amount of skill or computer
knowledge, attackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from
Malicious intruders
the Internet and launch them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools
have become more sophisticated, they have also become easier to use.
Organized crime groups are using spam, phishing, and spyware/malware
Criminal groups
to commit identity theft and online fraud.
Foreign intelligence Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their information
services
gathering and espionage activities.
The disgruntled insider is a principal source of computer crime. Insiders
may not need a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions
Insiders
because their knowledge of a target system often allows them to gain
unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system data.
Several nations are aggressively working to develop information warfare
doctrines, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single
Hostile
entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply,
Governments
communications, and economic infrastructures that support military
power–impacts that could affect the daily lives of U.S. citizens.
Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructures to
Terrorists
threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S.
economy, and damage public morale and confidence.
Industrial espionage seeks to acquire intellectual property and know-how
Industrial Spies
by clandestine methods

Motivation
Destruction,
Activism,
Recreation
Financial
advantage
Espionage, Enable
future attacks
Financial
advantage,
Revenge

Espionage,
Warfare

Ideology
Financial
advantage

A threat may be known to exist, but not significant. For instance, a company may know
of industrial spies targeting them from a competitor, but the company may deem the threat as
non-existent for specific portions of their infrastructure. For example, risk analysis may reveal
that an outlying control station that is operating with 20 year old technology is not a likely target.
It is unlikely that the competition would target this facility. Assigning additional security
resources to the remote control station is unwarranted. Therefore, in order to properly assign
resources, the severity of the threat must be determined.
Severity of Adversarial threat
Some industry experts speculate that since SCADA systems are typically custom made
for specific sector applications, that it requires a great deal of specific knowledge on a particular
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system and the specific industry in order to attack it. Furthermore, that the “specialized
knowledge” requirement will limit the number of attackers perhaps explains why SCADA
attacks are not nearly as common as attacks on other computer networks (Chikuni and Dondo,
2007). Although successful SCADA attacks are infrequent to date, there are indications of
increased interest by adversaries. In 2002, U.S. investigators found evidence on browser logs
showing Al-Qaeda operatives spending time on sites that offer programming for switches that
run critical infrastructures (Gellman, 2002). Also, during interrogations, Al-Qaeda prisoners
have expressed the organizations interest in targeting critical infrastructures (Gellman, 2002).
In September 2009, McAfee conducted a survey of critical infrastructure IT executives in
fourteen countries (Baker et al., 2010). The 600 respondents were asked a number of questions,
such as „How long before you expect a major cyber incident affecting critical infrastructures in
your country?‟ and „Are current laws in your country insufficient against cyber attacks?‟ Two
figures in the survey were particularly telling. Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents that
believe that foreign governments have been involved in cyber attacks against critical
infrastructure in their country. The largest responder was China with 75 percent. The lowest
was Spain with 42 percent. The United States responded with 60 percent. The vast majority
believe that foreign governments are already attacking their critical infrastructures.
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Figure 4. Suspected Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure (Baker et al., 2010)

Another significant graph, Figure 5, from the McAfee study describes the percentage of
large scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that selected countries have
experienced and their frequencies. Of the 13 countries listed on the graph 12 countries indicated
that they experience DDoS attacks daily. Approximately 55 percent of the respondents reported
large scale DDoS at least annually. However, these DDoS attacks only resulted in a damage to
reputation, service interruption, or critical breakdown 23 percent of the time overall (Baker et al.,
2010). These responses indicate that the adversary threat against critical infrastructure is high.
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Figure 5. Suspected Large Scale DDoS Attacks and Frequency (Baker et al., 2010)

Although there are similarities between IP networks and SCADA systems, there are
significant differences in the negative impact that results when these systems are successfully
attacked by an adversary. For example an interruption to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) will
typically result in a loss of revenue to customers. However, a similar interruption to a SCADA
system could cause the loss of proprietary information, damage to the economy, damage to the
environment and potentially significant loss of life (Stouffer et al., 2008).
IT systems connected to the Internet get attacked frequently. According to the DoD, their
computer networks are scanned and probed by external parties millions of times per day
(CBS/AP, 2009). These reconnaissance activities usually precede attacks. According to the
Carnegie-Mellon's Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) there
were 7,236 Computer system/IP vulnerabilities reported in 2007 and 44,074 vulnerabilities
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reported since they started keeping statistics in 1995 (Carnegie-Mellon CERT, 2010). Since
1998, the number of incidents reported to CERT/CC has increased significantly. Figure 6 shows
the number of reported incidents for the years 1990 through Q3 2003 for IP systems (CarnegieMellon CERT, 2010). The CERT/CC also notes that computer intrusion incidents are
underreported. For instance, some businesses may not want system hacks known publically,
because it could damage their reputation and result in the loss of current and future customers.
The trend for increasing incidents shows no sign of slowing. The Internet grew by 380 percent
from the year 2000 to 2009 and new vulnerabilities are routinely discovered (Internet World
Stats, 2010). As the Internet continues to grow, so does the attack surface, making yet more
incidents possible.

Year

Figure 6. Information Security Incidents: 1990–2001 (Carnegie-Mellon, 2010)
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A handful of incidents occurred where critical infrastructures were negatively impacted.
The British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) tracks network security incidents that
directly impact ICS and SCADA systems in their database (Byres et al., 2003). The BCIT
estimate there are approximately 100 cyber related incidents per year (Hildick-Smith, 2005).
According to the BCIT Industrial Security Incident Database for the year 2004, there was a sharp
increase in the number of incidents reported annually starting in 2001. Figure 7 shows the
Industrial Security Incidents from 1982 through 2006 as recorded in the BCIT.

Figure 7. Industrial Security Incidents by Year (Stouffer et al., 2008)

Additionally, prior to 2001, 70 percent of the attacks originated from insiders. From 2001
forward, there was a notable shift with 70 percent of the attacks originating from external sources
(Byres and Lowe, 2004). This shift in attack origin is likely due to increased connectivity of
SCADA networks to the Internet, thus dramatically increasing the attack surface of these
systems. As of September 2009, it is estimated that 80 percent of critical infrastructure operators
connect their SCADA systems to an IP network despite the security risks (Baker et al., 2010). A
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determined individual with an internet connection, phone line, or wireless connection could
attack SCADA systems and cause damage. Recent history provides numerous examples of
attacks against SCADA systems running across the threat spectrum from teenage recreational
hacker, to terrorist, to disgruntled insider.
Recent SCADA attacks
The preponderance of malicious cyber attacks have occurred on non-SCADA computer
networks. The numbers of reported and verified malicious attacks against SCADA systems are
small when compared to attacks against computer networks. One problem in verifying malicious
SCADA attacks is the difficulty of establishing attribution of the act to the attacker (Stouffer et
al., 2008). In recent years many malicious cyber attacks against SCADA systems worldwide
have caused significant monetary cost. The following are a number of impressive examples of
SCADA related utility outages. Although some were caused by acts of nature, or accidents, they
are instructive of the effects that are possible by attacking critical infrastructures.
1. 1997, Worcester Air Traffic Communications - In 1997, a juvenile accessed the phone
system operated by New York – New England Telephone Company (NYNEX). As a
result the telephone service was disrupted to the Federal Aviation Administration Tower
at the Worcester Airport, to the Worcester Airport Fire Department and to other related
entities. Additionally, aircraft were unable to send an electronic signal to activate the
runway lights on approach. Telephone service, including the 911 service, was also
disabled throughout the local area (Stouffer et al., 2008).
2. 1999, Bellingham Washington Gas Pipeline rupture - In June 1999 a steel gas pipeline
ruptured near Bellingham Washington, killing two children and an 18 year old, injuring
eight others and causing $45 million in property damage. There were numerous
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contributing factors to the accident including a SCADA system that became unresponsive
allowing pressure to build up beyond safety parameters. The National Transportation
Safety board concluded that if the SCADA system operated correctly the rupture would
not have happened (Carmody et al., 2002).
3. 2000, Maroochy Shire sewage control system - The Maroochy Shire, Queensland
computerized waste management system was hacked into by a disgruntled former
employee and caused millions of liters of raw sewage to spill out into local parks, rivers
and the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. The attack was conducted by an employee of
the subcontractor that installed the SCADA system and was later turned down for job
with the local government. He accessed the network through a wireless connection. The
cost of the incident was estimated at greater than $1 million (Smith, 2001).
4. 2003, Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear power plant - The Slammer worm penetrated a private
computer network at Ohio‟s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January 2003 and
disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours and a plant process computer
for six hours. The worm gained entry through a T1 line that bypassed the business
network firewall. The nuclear power plant was offline at the time and both systems had
redundant analog backups that were unaffected (Poulsen, 2003).
5. 2003, Northeast Blackout - On August 14, 2003, the largest power blackout in North
American history affected an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts (MW) of electric load in the states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, and the Canadian province of
Ontario. The series of events that contributed to the blackout started with a failure of an
alarm processor in First Energy‟s SCADA system. A short time later multiple high
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voltage lines in Ohio tripped due to contact with trees. This caused overloading of
additional high voltage lines which led to eventual failure of the power grid. The
blackout left some parts of the country without power for up to 4 days. The estimated
cost to the U.S. ranged between $4 billion and $10 billion (Liscouski et al., 2003).
6. 2003, DoS attack on an Israeli power plant - Iranian hackers attempted to hack into the
Israel Electric Corporation's computers and launch a denial of service attack to disrupt the
power supply in Israel. The attackers were foiled before any damage was inflicted
(Yamini, 2003).
7. 2003, CSX train service outage - In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus brought down
train signaling systems throughout the east coast of the U.S. The virus infected the
computer system at CSX Corporation‟s Jacksonville, Florida headquarters, shutting down
signaling, dispatching and other systems. This caused a number of train cancellations
and delays of long distance trains ranging from four to six hours (Hancock, 2003).
8. 2005, Taum Sauk Dam Failure – The dam was overtopped during a night time pumpback operation. More than 1 billion gallons of water were released when the Dam failed.
The overtopping was caused in large part due to improperly secured sensors that reported
false water levels to the SCADA operators (King and Calcagno, 2010).
Although not all of these mishaps were caused by a malicious party, it is clear from the
recent history that the consequences of utility interruptions are significant. An attacker with
sufficient motivation and knowledge could conduct a devastating attack against critical
infrastructures resulting in tremendous financial loss as well as the potential for loss of life.
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Attack Countermeasures
In order for a cyber attack to succeed, an attacker, vulnerability and a means of exploiting
the vulnerability must exist. If one or more of these don‟t exist then a successful attack is
unlikely. An attacker is also referred to as a threat. From a defensive standpoint it is very
difficult to eliminate a threat. Likewise exploits built to take advantage of vulnerabilities are
beyond the influence of defenders. SCADA systems defenders install countermeasures like IA
controls in order to mitigate known vulnerabilities (Stouffer et al., 2008). So, the primary factor
under the control of the SCADA systems operators is making their systems defensively strong
through countermeasures like implementing IA controls. According to MacAfee (2010), basic
security measures are not widely adopted by critical infrastructures around the world. It
describes a basic security measures adoption rate ranging from 62 percent on the high end to 40
percent on the low end (MacAfee, 2010). Also, the sector with the highest adoption rate was
banking and energy and the lowest water/sewage (MacAfee, 2010). DOD security measure
adoption rates are likely higher across all sectors due to directive regulations, but objective data
was not available to support this assertion. The next section describes future trends in SCADA
systems.
Future Trends
The spectrum of threats to SCADA systems will continue to evolve. Terrorist groups and
governments will continue to refine their tools, techniques and procedures (TTP) for targeting
SCADA systems. Governments will increasingly recognize that cyber attacks against SCADA
systems are an evolving area of warfare and national influence. China is currently investing
considerable effort into developing its cyber capabilities. The Chinese government has also
engaged in rhetoric toward other countries about their ability to adversely affect critical
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infrastructures by cyber means. There have been numerous cases in the recent past of Chinese
hackers breaking into U.S. government systems. As part of their military evolution, China is
seeking to achieve electronic dominance over its global competitors by the year 2050 (Coughlin,
2010).
Governments have three main challenges regarding the protection of critical
infrastructures. They must modify governmental organization structure to properly handle cyber
threats, find effective ways to share sensitive threat and vulnerability information, and deploy
capabilities to assist critical infrastructures for their common defense (Baker et al., 2010).
As the interest in SCADA systems increases, additional vulnerabilities will be discovered
over time. Safeguarding SCADA systems to ensure the functioning of the government, the
economy and society will continue as a core area of concern with the U.S. government. The
pursuit of SCADA systems security will continue to grow. Since SCADA systems are
increasingly connected to other networks, ease with which exploits are built against SCADA
systems will increase as well. The future is ripe for discovering new vulnerabilities and
exploitation of SCADA systems.
Related Research
In Mendezllovet‟s (2010) work titled “Codifying Information Assurance Controls for
DOD SCADA Systems”, the primary goal of the research was to compare and map IA controls
from the NIST SP 800-82 to the DOD IA Control framework. The primary tool in
Mendezllovet‟s research was a survey from Civil Engineer SMEs. A relative ranking was
produced within the three categories of Management, Operational and Technical IA controls.
Additionally, respondents strongly favored four of the eight new IA controls they considered for
potential inclusion into DOD regulations. This research in evaluating the effectiveness of IA
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controls may also provide additional insight into disconnects identified in Mendezllovet‟s (2010)
research. For example, in his research, Civil Engineer (CE) SMEs rated Certification and
Accreditation low as a management control and rated encryption high as a technical control.
Both of these issues were identified as out of synch with published information security
guidance. These potential touch points are examined in the conclusion of this research.
In Igure‟s (2007) doctoral thesis, a taxonomy of security vulnerabilities in SCADA
protocols, he addressed the problem of security assessment of SCADA communication
protocols. He used known SCADA protocol vulnerabilities to construct a taxonomy that
provides a method for security assessment of other SCADA protocols. As part of future work he
suggested that his research could support the effort to find relative risks of the various
vulnerabilities of the system. The paths of his taxonomy could be assigned numeric values.
These relative values would provide a risk grading on individual attacks and vulnerabilities
(Igure, 2007). This research will use a different tool in a similar manner as described by Igure in
order to determine security effectiveness of groupings of IA controls against a specific category
of attack and attack vector. This will also give a partial ranking of a group of IA controls.
Byres et al. (2004) describe the application of an attack tree methodology to a common
SCADA protocol. The goal is to use the attack tree as a method to assess the security risks in the
protocol to identify flaws that could cause damage to the SCADA system. The authors
developed 15 attacker goals, then built attack trees. They speculated that since there is very little
security inherent in SCADA protocols that any moderately skilled hacker would be able attack
the system if access is achieved. They made a number of important observations that are directly
applicable to this research. Attackers typically engage in reconnaissance activity prior to
launching an attack. Also, the clear precursor to a cyber attack is gaining network access to the
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target system. The team of authors believe that the technical difficulty is the most critical
indictor of attack success. Lastly, the authors suggested as future work an approach that better
aggregates attack tree subordinate node values and site specific parameters such as known
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. This research will address a portion of Byres et al (2004)
future work by incorporating an aggregation of subordinate leaf node values and IA control site
specific countermeasures into the attack tree.
Logistics Compliance Assessment Program
The Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) is an evaluation program to
ensure units key logistics processes are performed in a safe, standardized, repeatable and
technically compliant manner. In the Air Force, Major Commands (MAJCOMs) conduct LCAP
evaluations of subordinate units to assess their logistics proficiency. Air Force Instruction 20111, Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) standardizes the breadth, depth,
frequency, grading, and reporting requirements (Reno, 2009). The LCAP applies to AF units
performing duties across the spectrum of logistics to include fuels operations. Acceptable
quality levels are used to minimize subjectivity in LCAP evaluations and describe allowed
discrepancies. LCAP functional checklists are developed by AF/A4L in coordination with
MAJCOMs. The checklists serve as a guide for inspectors in assessing logistics units (Reno,
2009). The AFMC Fuels Management LCAP checklist was reviewed in order to glean aspects of
the operation which are vulnerable to a cyber attack. The following items may be susceptible to
cyber attack: accuracy of inventory, proper documentation of inspections and procedures,
documentation of training, certifications and qualifications, operational checklists and fuels
operating Instructions.
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Stuxnet
In June 2010, a complex computer worm was discovered which effectively disabled
Iran‟s nuclear program for more than a year. Later this worm was given the name Stuxnet. It is
suspected that the worm initially propagated from thumb drives that were carried by personnel
from one computer to another, even broaching Iranian air gapped systems. For almost 17
months, Stuxnet targeted a specific Siemens centrifuge control component to moderate the speed
at which the nuclear facilities‟ centrifuges rotated in order to damage, but not destroy them
(Barnes, 2010). The worm is also capable of masking its own actions, making troubleshooting
for the root cause extremely difficult. Even though the Iranians are aware that their systems are
infected with the worm and have spent substantial resources in cleaning-up, the worm is so
virulent that they continue to be plagued by it (Barnes, 2010).
Stuxnet uses a digitally signed kernel-mode rootkit. It has approximately 4,000 functions
which is comparable to some commercial software products (ICS-CERT, 2010). Stuxnet takes
advantage of 4 zero day exploits. Two of the zero days have since been patched. It also uses the
same exploit as the Conficker worm (ICS-CERT, 2010). It appears that a thumb drive is the
primary means of propagation, but the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) has noted that it can also spread via network shares, STEP7 Project files,
WinCC database files, and a print spooler vulnerability (ICS-CERT, 2010). As of October 2010,
Symantec estimates that over 100,000 computers are infected with Stuxnet worldwide, with 60%
of those infections in Iran (Jarema, 2010).
Computer experts at Microsoft who examined the worm estimate that it took 10,000 manhours to build. Others conclude that it must have been developed by a nation state due to its
sophistication and ability to target very specialized proprietary vendor equipment (Barnes, 2010).
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Experts have a long way to go to discover all of the intricacies of the exploit as reverse
engineering work continues. The Stuxnet worm is an interesting and relevant real-world exploit
to choose as part of this research.
NIST IA Controls
The purpose of NIST SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, is
to provide guidance for securing ICS, SCADA systems, DCS, and other systems performing
control functions in critical infrastructure operations. It recommends security countermeasures
via a list of many different methods and techniques for securing SCADA systems in order to
mitigate associated risks. The guide encourages readers to perform a risk-based assessment on
their systems and to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to meet their specific
security, business and operational requirements (Stouffer et al., 2008). Security controls are
defined as the management, operation, and technical safeguards and countermeasures identified
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and system (Katzke et
al. 2006). The 30 IA controls as described in NIST SP 800-82 are listed in Table 7. These
security controls will be incorporated into the attack tree described later in Chapter 3.
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Table 7. ICS Security Controls (Stouffer et al., 2008)
Management Controls
Risk Assessment
Planning
System and Service Acquisition
Certification, Accreditation, and Security
Assessments
Operational Controls
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Protection
Control Center/Control Room
Portable Devices
Cabling
Contingency Planning
Disaster Recovery Planning
Configuration Management
System and Information Integrity
Malicious Code Detection
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Patch Management
Media Protection
Incident Response
Awareness and Training
Technical Controls
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Physical Token Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
Web Servers
Virtual Local Area Network
Dial-up Modems
Wireless
Audit and Accountability
Encryption
Virtual Private Network

Different critical infrastructure operations may implement only a subset of the IA
controls. Depending on the degree to which the ICS is integrated into the operation,
implementation of some IA controls is not possible. For instance, if an operation does not
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possess any portable devices then the operational control for portable devices is not
implemented.
Fault Trees
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a tool used for safety and reliability evaluations to analyze
and visually display failure paths in a system. It provides a means for systems level risk
evaluations via a tree structure (Ericson, 1999). FTA is about 50 years old as of this writing and
is widely used around the world. The failure behavior of the system is modeled in a visual fault
tree. The simple set of logic rules and symbols within the tree structure make qualitative and
quantitative evaluation of very complex systems possible (Ericson, 1999). The construction of
fault trees is simple, but Ericson (1999) warns that if the tree becomes too complex, they become
much more difficult to solve. He states that the ability to evaluate is directly related to fault tree
size, complexity and computer capacity. It‟s important to briefly discuss fault trees as the
precursor from which attack trees evolved. Attack trees take advantage of all of the features of
fault trees plus additional capabilities.
Attack Trees
Attack trees, just like fault trees are models of reality (Ericson, 1999). They provide a
simplified representation of complex real world drivers. The accuracy underlying the drivers and
future analysis depend on time/effort spent studying them and assumptions made.
In an attack tree, the attacks against the target are represented by an upside down tree
structure with the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as sub-goals
and leaf nodes as the lowest level tasks (Schneier, 1999). The leaf nodes contain user-definable
values called indicator values to store attributes of that leaf node. It is possible to assign multiple
user-defined variables in the form of Boolean, continuous, or explicitly specified values to the
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leaf nodes. For instance, a Boolean value could take the form of breach of trust, either true or
false, a continuous value such as cost, from zero to potentially millions of dollars and explicitly
specified values such as 1 for low to 4 for high. There are many other possibilities for
continuous node values to include, but not limited to - technical difficulty, technical ability,
noticeability, impact of attack, probability of apprehension, likelihood of attack success, site
conditions and installed countermeasures (Byres, 2004). This research uses, in part, publically
available attack data as a source to populate indicator values in the attack tree. For a large attack
tree there can be thousands of potential attack scenarios if all possible paths are followed in order
to read the root goal. In order to narrow down the number of attacks to better match the potential
threat, a threat agent profile is applied to the tree. In the SecureITree software a threat agent
profile defines the capabilities of the attacker. The threat agent profile is user defined with
operators on the indicator values which describe the capabilities and limitations of the specific
attacker, thus reducing the number of potential paths that are available to reach the root goal
(Ingoldsby, 2010).
The attack tree includes both physical and cyber attacks for completeness. It shows the
touch points between the two and how they affect one-another. Additionally, it highlights the
mutually exclusive physical and cyber aspects of possible attacks. Just like fault trees, if the
attack tree becomes too complex, the utility is lost. Therefore, only cyber attacks are evaluated
in this research. Also to ensure the tree is not too complex, the lowest level tasks are kept at a
course level of description. For instance, the low level task of “searching the Internet” for target
information could include the sub-task of accessing the Internet, navigating to Google,
navigating to target website, etc…. However, the task is left as “searching the Internet” for
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better utility. The tasks are broken down to the point where further subdividing them does not
contribute to the overall research effort to reveal the IA control system security effectiveness.
Attack trees are compelling tools for a number of reasons. Attack trees provide a
methodical way of describing the security of systems, based on varying attacks and attacker
profiles (Schneier, 1999). The use of attack trees allows the comparison of technical and nontechnical attacks which leads to a more comprehensive analysis of threats and vulnerabilities
(Franz et al., 2004). They also capture knowledge in a reusable form and are scalable, so the
creator does not need to be an expert in everything (Schneier, 1999). Attack trees also focus
analysis on measureable goals that can ultimately be translated into specific tests against real
world implementations (Byres, 2004). For instance if an organization experienced significant
financial loss over a period of time due to physical theft of property, they may develop the goal
of reducing financial loss due to theft. The use of an attack tree can reveal specific areas to
further develop security courses of action in order to reduce the likelihood of theft and thus
reduce future financial loss. Attack trees also allow for a structured elaboration of events in
order for an attack to be successful (Byres, 2004). These distinctive capabilities of attack trees
make the tool well suited to answer security related questions.
Limitations of Attack Trees
There are a number of disadvantages to attack trees. The main disadvantage of attack
trees is that they provide only the choice between and/or nodes. This limits the ways a goal can
be broken down into sub-goals (Buhan, Bazen, Hartel & Veldhuis, 2006). Another limitation is
that attack trees may not consider secondary factors. For instance, a robust insider threat
monitoring program may catch a malicious insider and prevent an incident. Also, a realistic
estimation of the indicator values at the leaf node level is difficult to get exactly right (Opel,
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2005). Additionally, it may be difficult to break the leaf node actions into totally independent
steps (Piètre-Cambacédès & Bouissou, 2010). Lastly, the creation of a complete Attack Tree is
virtually impossible. They can give a false sense of security. Some attack vectors may be
overlooked. It is always limited by the skills and depth of knowledge of the creator (Opel,
2005). Although attack trees have limitations, they have numerous characteristics which make
them well suited for modeling purposes in this research.
Attack Tree Modeling Software
Modeling software can significantly assist in the creation and enumeration of attack trees.
SecureITree software was purchased by AFIT in order to facilitate research in the Center for
Cyberspace Research (CCR). This software provides the capability to model attack trees in a
visual manner. It further incorporates the application of various indicator values to the leaf
nodes. Additional operations are available to analyze attack scenarios, threat agents, risk, and
allows the propagation of indicator values up the tree. An example of an attack tree with the root
goal called Root is displayed in Figure 8. In order for an AND node to be true, all subordinate
leaf nodes must be true. Conversely for an OR node to be true, only one of the subordinate leaf
nodes need be true. Finally, since the root node is the ultimate goal of the attacker, the indicators
associated with it reflect the resources required to compromise the system (Byres, 2004).
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Figure 8. Example Attack Tree

Oil and Gas Pipeline sector
The specific critical infrastructure for this research is fuels operations, which is part of
the oil and gas pipeline sector. This is a high interest area for the government and military.
Access to petroleum and its associated operations are literally the fuel that enables war and
drives modern civilization. This sector was chosen due to existing research efforts supported by
HQ AF A4/A7 and an established relationship between the CCR and the local WPAFB fuels
flight. The local fuels operation was utilized as the foundation of the attack tree model and
appropriate NIST SP 800-82 IA controls were incorporated.
Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a summary of the current state of critical infrastructure control
systems protection and exploitation. The compelling cost and operational benefits continues to
drive increased connectivity of control systems to corporate networks. This increased
connectivity also increases the attack surface of control systems. It is highly probable that
motivated adversaries will attack SCADA systems. Since critical infrastructure owners and
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operators worldwide are seeing increased attack activity, governments are eager to partner with
private entities to ensure their continued function.
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"I am tempted to make a slightly exaggerated statement: that logistics is all of war-making,
except shooting the guns, releasing the bombs, and firing the torpedoes."
- ADM Lynde D. McCormick, USN
III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the research methodology for the IA control system security
effectiveness effort. It describes the approach, data sources, building the attack tree,
understanding probability, and limitations. It concludes with a brief outline of how results are
interpreted in the data analysis chapter.
Introduction
This research will provide insight into which IA controls are most significant for network
defenders and SCADA systems operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of critical
infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit. Since the attack vector is the most advanced
exploit found to date against critical infrastructure, this research is timely to identify those
critical IA controls which are most effective in mitigating a successful attack.
Approach
This study continues the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) AF/A4/7 – Logistics,
Installations & Mission Support sponsored research effort into critical infrastructure protection.
A portion of the framework in Risk Assessment section of NIST 800-30, Risk Management
Guide for Information Technology Systems is used to develop a Risk Level Matrix and then
recommend particular IA controls. The Likelihood determination, step five of the guide, is
developed via a cyber attack tree modeled on the WPAFB fuels operation. The attack tree is
generated from operator checklists, annual rate of occurrence from significant mission impacting
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events, the NIST IA controls, existing survey data and direct researcher observation of
operations. Next, a meaningful way to represent the probability of attacker success is
determined. It will then be used to develop the probability values related to IA controls and
individual attacker actions which culminate in an overall probability of adversary success. Then
an analysis is performed on the paths an attacker can take in order to achieve the overall goal and
five specific, different attack scenarios are chosen. The attack scenarios will allow the attacker
to produce specific adverse impacts against the SCADA system. Next an impact analysis, step 6
of the guide, is performed to determine the adverse impact resulting from a successful attack.
The impact analysis data is obtained via a survey instrument of six WPAFB Fuels SMEs. Then a
risk determination, step 7 of the guide, is made using the SME responses along with the
probability of adversary success to develop a risk matrix. Finally the risk matrix will point to the
group of IA controls which most significantly contributes to system security against a Stuxnetlike cyber attack, producing the IA control recommendations, step 8 of the guide.
Understanding Probability of Adversary Success
Attack trees are particularly useful in estimating the risk for situations where the event
happens infrequently or has not occurred before. Attack trees greatly improve risk estimation by
incorporating not only knowledge of the defender‟s system, but also the adversary that will
attack it. Risk is an expression of the likelihood that a threat actor will exploit a vulnerability of
a target (Byres, 2004).
Ingoldsby (2010) identifies a number of different types of risk that are expressed as
equations in the SecureITree software. The various types of risk include attack risk, attack
scenario relative risk, absolute risk, probabilistic risk, capitalistic risk, and total risk. All of the
risk calculations in the SecureITree software require subjective input from the user. In an effort
49

to reduce the amount of subjective data introduced into this research, it was desirable to seek
another way to calculate risk that was more objective. Ayyub, McGill & Kaminsky (2007)
introduced an equation to describe risk with only three variables. The probability of adversary
success, Ps is described as one minus the system security effectiveness (1 - Es), multiplied by
both the probability of attack success, Pk and the probability distribution of hazard intensity
imparted on the target, Q. This equation, Ps = (1 - Es) Pk Q, is used as the starting point and
modified in order to arrive at an equation to describe the overall probability of adversary success
of a specific cyber attack using the attack tree. The equation is reduced by recognizing that Q
has no meaning at the task level. The expression of the hazard intensity only has meaning at the
root node of the cyber attack tree where all of the sub-tasks come together and the effect of the
attack takes place. For this research Q will be held at the value of 1. The modified equation
describing the probability of adversary success is Ps = (1 - Es) Pk.
The above equation describes the probability of adversary success for a specific leaf node
action with one IA control applied. Therefore the total probably of adversary success for a
specific leaf node, Pleaf, with multiple IA controls applied is represented as the sum of all of the
Ps‟s, divided by n, the number of IA controls which impact the particular leaf node, see Figure 9.

Figure 9. Probability of Adversary success for specific leaf node

Next, it is necessary to calculate the probability at each of the OR and AND nodes below
the root node. The probability is calculated as the average of the leaf nodes for an AND node.
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OR node probabilities are calculated as the minimum of its leaf nodes. These probability rules
then propagate up the tree to the root node. Finally the probability generated at the root node is
the overall probability of adversary success for a specific attack scenario.
Method for Creating Attack Tree
In order to build an effective attack tree, it is desirable to follow a methodical, structured
process in an iterative manner to guide thought. Schneier provides a straightforward method for
creating an attack tree (Schneier, 1999). The steps are displayed graphically in Figure 10 and
outlined below as follows:
Steps to Create an Attack Tree
1. Identify possible attack goals
2. Form a separate tree for each goal, they may share subtrees or leaf nodes
3. Brainstorm attacks against each goal
4. Add these attacks to the tree
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until tree is complete
6. Give to someone else for review/additions
7. Add to/refine tree as necessary over time

Start

1. Identify
Possible
Attack Goals

2. Form a
separate
tree for
each Goal

3. Brainstorm
attacks
against each
Goal

Creating
an
Attack Tree

7. Add
to/refine tree
over time

End
Complete
Attack Tree

4. Add
these
attacks to
the tree

5. Repeat
until
complete

6. Give to
someone else
for
review/additions

Figure 10. Creating an Attack Tree (Schneier, 1999)
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Data Collection
In order to ensure the attack tree is as thorough and complete as possible, a number of
source documents are utilized to assist in its construction.
- Fuels flight operating instructions
- Quality checklists (QCL)
- Inspector General inspection results
- Various DoD and AF level petroleum regulations
- Fuels Manager Defender documentation
- Direct observations of fuels flight operation
- Amenaza SecureITree software references
- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 3, Recommended Security Controls for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations
- NIST SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security
- NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems
The broad variety of sources and their thoughtful consideration used to create the attack
tree ensures it is sufficiently complete.
Building the Attack Tree
In this research, the attack tree root goal is to cause a disruption of fuels operations. The
result of a successful attack makes it possible for the attacker to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt,
deceive or delay aspects of the fuels operation. Potential threat agents against critical
infrastructure include the broad categories: natural, accidental and malicious (Bundbury, 2009).
The variation in potential threat agent attacks against critical infrastructure is expansive, running
the gambit from teenage hacker, nation state actor, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks,
disgruntled employee, and hurricane to heat wave and points in between. This research focuses
on those attacks that are believed most common. According to MacAfee (2010), more than half
of the executives surveyed said they had experienced large scale denial of service attacks and
“stealthy infiltration” by a high level adversary like organized crime, or a nation state against
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their critical infrastructure operation. Furthermore, fifty-nine percent of those surveyed believe
that foreign governments had already been involved in attacks and infiltrations in their countries
(Baker et al., 2010). Additionally the computer experts reverse engineering the Stuxnet worm
suspect the worm was generated by a nation state (Barnes, 2010). The prevailing belief is that
attacks on critical infrastructures by a well-organized nation state adversary with specific goals
are common. Additionally, according to Byres (2004), 70 percent of the security incidents on
critical infrastructures were from an external source during the years of 2001-2003. The
majority of those attacks, 51 percent originated remotely via the Internet. Therefore, for this
research the primary threat agent applied to the attack tree is a sophisticated, wealthy, remote and
anti-social adversary. The adversary is highly technically competent and has substantial
resources at their disposal. Lastly, the threat agent only attacks remotely and does not engage in
physical attacks, nor social engineering.
The major sub-trees of the attack tree was built using the cyber attack methodology
outlined in the book Counter-Hack Reloaded as a base-line in order to capture all the steps which
typically occur in a cyber attack (Skoudis & Liston, 2006). Additionally, specific Stuxnetrelated vulnerabilities were incorporated consistent with those described in US-CERT and ICSCERT (2010). The attack tree was ported to SecureITree software. See Appendix B for the
complete base stuxnet attack tree.
Indicator Values
The attack tree leaf nodes contain user-definable values called indicators to store
characteristics of that leaf node. The necessary indicator values were determined and each leaf
node was assigned indicators values as shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Leaf node Indicator variables (Ingoldsby, 2010)
Indicator Name
Probability of adversary success
System security effectiveness
Probability of attack Success
Technical Difficulty

Type
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Specified

Physical presence
Breach of trust

Boolean
Boolean

Value Range
0..1
0..1
0..1
0 - Unlikely, .1 - Difficult, .5 - Moderate,
.9 - Trivial, 1 – None
T/F
T/F

Description of Indicator Values
The following paragraphs describe the indicator values and how values were determined
for specific leaf nodes. The probability of adversary success was calculated as the values
propagate up the tree. All other calculations of indicator values were done outside of the
SecureITree software. See Appendix E for Indicator Value Summary.
Probability of adversary success: The probability of adversary success is the average
of the probability of adversary successes as they propagate up the tree. See Figure 9 for
equation. For a specific attack scenario there is only one overall probability of adversary
success value at the root node. The lower the value the less likely the adversary will be
successful.
System security effectiveness: The system security effectiveness is the degree to which
the IA control is effective in defending the system. This value was obtained by
extrapolating it from existing survey data. See appendix G further explanation (Freyre et
al., 2010). The system security effectiveness value is the Es value in the equation
described in Figure 9. The larger the value, the more security the IA control provides for
the system.
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Probability of attack success: The probability of attack success describes the
probability that a particular leaf node action will be successful. It equals the technical
difficulty for that leaf node. The lower this value, the lower the likelihood of attack
success. See Appendix H for Probability of Attack Success Matrix.
Technical difficulty: This indicator is used to determine the probability of attack
success. According to Byers (2004) the technical difficulty of an attack is the most
critical indicator of attack success. The higher the technical difficulty, the lower the
probability of successful attack execution. See Table 9 for enumeration of the different
tiers of technical difficulty. Objective data was not available to determine these values,
therefore technical difficulty was determined and assigned by the researcher.
Recognizing that the precise values of technical difficulty were not of critical importance,
the researcher sought to assign values that were appropriate to the leaf node actions
relative to each other. An effort was made to ensure the values assigned were consistent
with the Threat Likelihood scale provided in NIST 800-30, Risk Management Guide for
Information Technology Systems, pg 25.
Table 9. Description of Technical Difficulty (Byres, 2004)

Name
None
Trivial
Moderate
Difficult
Unlikely
Not Applicable

Technical Difficulty
Description
No technical skill required
Little technical skill required
Average cyber hacking skills required
Demands a high degree of technical expertise
Beyond the known capability of today‟s best hackers
Not Applicable
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Value
1
.9
.5
.1
0
-

Physical presence: Physical presence is a Boolean indicator that describes the need for
an attacker to be physically present at the target in order to accomplish the leaf node
action. If this indicator is false, then the action is executed remotely.
Breach of trust: Breach of trust is a Boolean indicator that describes the insider threat.
If this value is true, then an insider is necessary for the leaf node action to succeed. If the
value is false, then an insider is not necessary for success.
Associating IA Controls with Leaf node actions
The leaf nodes of the attack tree and the IA controls were associated with each other via a
matrix with the leaf node actions on the vertical and the IA controls listed horizontally. Further,
the values for the systems security effectiveness and technical difficulty where input. See
appendix H for Probability of attack success matrix. The association of leaf node actions and IA
controls were assigned as determined reasonable by the researcher. The NIST 800-82, Guide to
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security was used as a source to assist in determining which IA
controls are associated with the leaf node actions. Where the IA control had influence over the
leaf node action, a partial probability of adversary success was calculated at that junction. For
leaf nodes which were impacted by multiple IA controls, the average of the probability of
adversary success was taken for that leaf node. Additionally the IA controls associated with each
leaf node were annotated in the notes section in SecureITree.
The attack tree was passed to AFIT faculty and students who are knowledgeable in attack
tree creation. Step six of Figure 10 directs that the attack tree be given to someone else for
review/additions. The attack tree created for this research was provided to four AFIT faculty and
a master‟s student who attended the SecureITree training to conduct a review for completeness.
Two of the faculty instructors were cyber operations officers, each with over 18 years of
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experience. The third faculty member has been an instructor at AFIT for 7 years and a IT
security professional for 25 years. The fourth faculty member is a cyber security research
engineer specializing in critical infrastructure. The final reviewer was a master‟s student with 10
years experience in Information Management who is also using an attack tree in his research.
Following through with this step ensures that the attack tree captures a more complete picture of
possible attacks and is rooted in operational reality. Feedback was incorporated into the final
attack tree going forward in the remainder of this research.
Survey
The purpose of the survey is to seek USAF fuels subject matter experts (SME) ranking of
cyber incidents against the fuels Automated Information System (AIS). This data, in conjunction
with the probability of adversary success, will be used to determine which IA controls are most
influential in securing the fuels AIS against a specific cyber attack. It will be administered to six
personnel who work in fuels operations/management.
Population
The target population is USAF Fuels subject matter experts (SMEs). The sample was
drawn from WPAFB Fuels flight personnel due to an existing research relationship. Also HQ
AFMC/A4RE personnel were included due to proximity as targets of opportunity. The
personnel participating met the following criteria:
They possess extensive experience in fuels operations
They have fuels SCADA system experience
They volunteered to participate in the study
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Survey Overview
The survey instrument consists of three parts. Part one consists of demographics which
asks questions about years of experience, computer security/network security training, industry
certifications and affiliation with the government. Part two asks respondents to assign an impact
rating of low, medium or high to given incidents. The definitions provided for low, medium and
high are derived from NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems, pg. 23. The respondents are rating the incidents in the right column of Table 10.
Mapping of Vulnerability Leaf Nodes to Incidents. Part three asks respondents to further refine
each incident they ranked in Part two. They are directed to consider all other incidents they can
think of that fall within the same category and provide a value for the incident. These values
range from: Low (1 to 10); Medium (11 to 50); High (51 to 100), derived from NIST SP 800-30,
pg. 25. See Appendix I for full survey instrument.
Table 10. Mapping of Vulnerability Leaf Nodes to Incidents
Network Device Leaf Node

Stuxnet vulnerability Leaf node

Exploit vulnerable application

Step 7 Project files

Exploit vulnerable application

Exploit Vulnerable WinCC

Exploit vulnerable Windows
XP Operating System

Exploit Print Spooler vulnerability

Network Server

Exploit vulnerable Server Service

Network Server

Exploit Vulnerable Network
Shares

Effect
Alter Fuels Manager Defense
(FMD) database data
Alter FMD real time HumanMachine Interface (HMI) data
Cause the computer hard
drive where FMD resides to
crash
Transmit a false report to the
Fuels Enterprise System
Disrupt FMD
Communications

Risk Matrix
The purpose of the NIST 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems is to provide a structure for the development of an effective risk management program.
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It provides descriptions and practical guidance needed for assessing and mitigating risks
discovered within IT systems. The ultimate goal of the guide is to assist organizations to better
manage IT-related mission risks (Stoneburner et.al, 2002). This guide contains recognized
industry best practices and recommendations from NIST. The risk matrix is obtained from NIST
800-30, pg 25. There is no comparable risk matrix currently available specifically for SCADA
systems, so this information systems risk matrix is used.
The risk matrix combines the results obtained from the attack tree and the survey. For
the purposes of this research the threat likelihood is replaced with the probability of adversary
success. The verbiage is different, but they both describe the same thing, the probability that the
overall adversary attack succeeds. The values for the probability of adversary success are placed
along the Y axis were threat likelihood is shown in Figure 11. In a similar manner the SME
impact from the survey is placed along the X axis on the risk matrix. The resulting intersections
will be plotted in a graph and analyzed in chapter 4. The scale of the X and Y axis are pulled
directly from NIST 800-30 without modification. There is no need to deviate from the scale
provided because it is a recognized guideline for best practices and fits well within the research
methodology.
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Figure 11. Risk Level Matrix (Stoneburner et al., 2002)

Limitations of this approach
Attack trees are subjective, because they reflect the thought process of their creator.
Also, it holds true that “more heads are better than one” in building attack trees. This ensures
that there are differing individual thought processes applied to the same problem, resulting in a
stronger tree. The attack tree in this research was created by a single individual and validated by
peer review. The review made the tree stronger, but it may not be as robust as an attack tree
generated by a group. Also, data for the technical difficulty and probability of attack success
were determined subjectively because objective data were not available. Since there was no
objective data there was no way to evaluate the underlying probably distribution. Therefore, no
assumption was made about the underlying probability distribution. Also, the manner in which
the probably of adversary success was propagate up the attack tree may not be optimal.
Averaging the probabilities fit well into the risk level matrix management tool, but also likely
smoothed out the probabilities which may skew the results. Once again, objective data could
shed additional light on a better way to propagate the probabilities up the tree. Additionally, due
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to the thousands of available attack scenarios within the tree, a small subset of specific attack
scenarios were selected for examination consistent with available attack trend data. As a
consequence, potentially relevant data within those discarded scenarios are not included.
Finally, inclusion of commercial proprietary data may make the attack tree applicable to a larger
cross section of the critical infrastructure community. But due to its sensitive nature, proprietary
data was not available for this research.
Data Analysis Procedure
The methodology presented here utilizes an attack tree based on WPAFB fuels
operations. The probability of adversary success associated with each of the lowest level tasks
contributes to the overall probability of adversary success of the specific attack. The probability
of adversary success will vary depending on which leaf node actions are taken to reach the root
goal and their corresponding IA controls. A survey of fuels operations SMEs provides the
impact rating of specific incidents which are possible after a successful attack. These impact
ratings are then coupled with the earlier probability to develop the risk matrix. The data points in
the matrix will fall into one of nine quadrants, as in Figure 11. By examining the data points in
the matrix, it will reveal the most influential IA controls. These IA controls will appear where
the probability of adversary success is lowest. Therefore, the most influential IA controls will
fall into the lower portion of the matrix, meaning those defensive IA controls are most effective.
Also, the further to the right on the impact axis, the more significant the impact of the event. So,
the closer to the lower right-hand portion of the matrix, the more significant the associated IA
controls to reducing risk and increasing systems security.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter provided the methodology for determining the most significant IA controls
to secure a fuel operation SCADA system against a specific cyber attack. It described the data
sources used to populate an attack tree based on a fuels operation. The process of building the
attack tree and narrowing down the IA controls associated with specific attacks is described.
Then an equation describing probably of attack success was modified in a number of steps to get
to the final equation to describe the probability of adversary success. Next, potential limitations
to this approach are addressed. Finally, the data analysis procedure was described. The next
chapter describes the analysis of data.
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IV. Data Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents an analysis of the survey data collected from the WPAFB fuels
operations SMEs. It also examines the probability of adversary success of the five specific
attack scenarios. Next, the probability of adversary success from the attack scenarios and the
incident impact are combined into a risk matrix. Finally, the risk matrix is analyzed to determine
the most influential IA controls in securing the SCADA system.
Survey
Six members of the WPAFB fuels operation and HQ AFMC/A4RE were surveyed to
obtain SME rankings on specified incident impacts for a cyber attack on the fuels operation. The
following paragraphs analyze and discuss the responses to the WPAFB fuels operations survey.
See appendix I for the full survey instrument.
Part I - Demographics
There were four questions in the demographics section. The first question asked how
many years of experience does the respondent have in operating or managing fuels industrial
control systems. The respondents in the survey all had at least 11 years and the majority had
over 21 years of experience, see Figure 12.
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Years experience in Fuels Industrial Control
Systems
1
1

1-5 Years
6-10 Years

4

11-15 Years
16-20 Years
21 Years or more

Figure 12. Years experience in Fuels Industrial Control Systems

Question two asked for all computer security or network security training completed in
the last five years. Table 11 lists the Computer Security or Network Security Training
respondents have received in the last five years. Most of the respondents listed both Information
Assurance Awareness and Information Protection training. Only one respondent did not indicate
Information Protection training. This is likely an oversight, because it is a requirement in order
to use the Air Force network. Respondents did not indicate any additional training outside of
annual AF training requirements.
Table 11. Computer Security or Network Security Training in Last 5 Years
Computer Security/Network Security Training
DoD Information Assurance Awareness
Information Protection
Total
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Number
6
5
11

Question three asked for a list of all industry certifications successfully completed in the
last five years. See Table 12 Industry certifications in last 5 years. The low number of
certifications is surprising. One respondent had both the Level I and II Quality Assurance
Certifications and another had a Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) 6.0 certification. The Air Force
requires quality assurance certifications in order to manage contracted operations. Also, it makes
sense a current fuels operator would have an FMD certification. There were four out of the six
respondents who listed no industry certifications in the last five years. It may be the case that the
respondents have additional certifications they obtained more than five years ago.
Table 12. Industry Certifications in Last 5 Years
Industry Certifications
Number
Level I Quality Assurance Certification
1
Level II Quality Assurance Certification
1
Fuels Manager Defense 6.0
1
Total
3

The final question asks respondents about their primary affiliation with the government.
The respondents were evenly split with two civil servants, two military and two contractors. See
Figure 13 for Primary Affiliation with Government.
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Primary affiliation with Government

2

2
Contractor
Military
2

Civil Service
Other

Figure 13. Primary Affiliation with Government

Part II – Impact Rating
This section of the survey asked respondents to rate the impact magnitudes for the five
incidents. The incidents were rated as Low, Medium or High impact. The definitions for these
ratings were taken directly from NIST 800-30 Risk Management Guide for Information
Technology systems, page 23. The mode is also displayed for each incident. See Table 13.
Incident Impact Ratings.
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Table 13. Incident Impact Ratings

Respondent
(Low, Med, High)
Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mode
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD)
database data
L H M H H H H
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine
Interface (HMI) data
M M M M H H M
Cause the FMD computer hard drive
to crash
L H M M M L M
Transmit a false report to the Fuels
Enterprise System
L M M M M L M
Disrupt FMD Communications
L M L L M M L/M

Part III – Impact Category refinement
This section of the survey asked respondents to further score the incident impact within
the rating they assigned in Part II. Scores were assigned in the following guidelines: Low
impact (1 to 10), Medium impact (11 to 50), High impact (51 to 100). Respondents were to take
into account all other events that can occur in that magnitude of impact category. These scores
are averaged in the rightmost column of Table 14.
Table 14 shows the fuels SMEs rated almost all incidents medium with one high. The data
shows that the respondents put a high degree of importance on the accuracy of the data in their
database. The impact of real-time data on the HMI and the computer hard drive failure averaged
to medium. Lastly, the respondents attach a much lower importance on the accuracy of data in
and communications to systems external to their own. This concludes the analysis of the survey,
the next section discusses reduction of IA controls in the attack tree.
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Table 14. Incident Impact Scores

Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data
Cause the FMD computer hard drive to crash
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System
Disrupt FMD Communications

Respondent Impact
Average
(Low, Med, High)
Rating
1 2 3 4 5 6
10 80 50 100 70 60
61.7
35 30 50 15 75 75
46.7
10 85 50 45 40 5
39.2
3 20 50 40 25 5
23.8
3 40 10 5 15 20
15.5

Reduction of IA controls in attack tree
In building the attack tree, some of the IA controls were eliminated either because they
were not implemented by the WPAFB fuels operation, or because the particular attack was not
impacted by the IA control. For instance, at the time of this research, the wireless point of sale
devices were non-operational. Therefore the wireless IA control was not considered. Also, since
this research focuses on a specific type of cyber attack, any IA controls associated with physical
security and breach of trust were not considered as well. This process eliminated 14 IA Controls,
see Table 15. IA Controls Eliminated for non-applicability.
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Table 15. IA Controls Eliminated for Non-applicability
Management Controls
Planning
Operational Controls
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Protection
Control Center/Control Room
Portable Devices
Cabling
Contingency Planning
Disaster Recovery Planning
Media Protection
Technical Controls
Physical Token Authentication
Virtual Local Area Network
Wireless
Encryption
Virtual Private Network

Specific attack scenarios were chosen which broadly matched attacks listed in the SANS
(SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute top 20 security risks for 2007 (Safier, Rouse,
Paller, Kotkov, Sarwate, Skoudis, et al., 2007). The probability of adversary success for each of
these attack scenarios will form the Y-axis of the risk matrix. The specific attack tree leaf node
actions were examined within the five chosen cyber attacks. See Appendix F for Leaf Node,
Effect Mapping for mapping of attack tree vulnerabilities to attacker effects.
After eliminating IA controls that are not applicable, the remaining IA controls which are
associated with the 5 cyber attack scenarios are listed in Table 16.
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Table 16. IA Controls Associated with 5 Cyber Attack Scenarios
Management Controls
Risk Assessment
System and Service Acquisition
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments
Operational Controls
Configuration Management
System and Information Integrity
Malicious Code Detection
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Patch Management
Incident Response
Awareness and Training
Technical Controls
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
Web Servers
Dial-up Modems
Audit and Accountability

Attack Tree Analysis
The five attack scenarios were derived from the Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree in the
SecureITree software. See Appendix C for Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree. The probability
of adversary success at the root node and the eight major sub-trees were calculated, see Table 17.
A number of observations emerge from the calculated probability of adversary success values.
One, the variability between the highest scenario probability and the lowest is .13 on a 0 to 1
point scale. So the probabilities of all of the 5 scenarios fall within a small 13% band of the
scale. Looking at the major sub-trees for all of the attack scenarios, there is a significant range in
values from the lowest to the highest probability. For all the attack scenarios the range is .9219,
which covers approximately 92% of the scale. Finally, most of the major sub-trees within the
attack scenarios when compared to each other have little variability. This is a product of the how
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the attack tree was created. Many of the major sub-trees have only AND nodes, or few OR
nodes which dramatically reduces the potential values of the probability of adversary success of
that sub-tree.
Table 17. Probability of Adversary Success of Specific Attacks

Probability of Adversary Success per Major Sub-tree

Select Exploit

Reconnaissance

Scanning

Gain Access

Deploy Exploit

Covering Tracks and Concealment

Maintain Access

Execute Exploit

0.1000
0.1000
0.1000
0.1000
0.1000

0.3515
0.4930
0.3515
0.4930
0.3515

0.4863
0.4863
0.4863
0.4863
0.4863

0.0781
0.0781
0.0781
0.0781
0.0781

0.4910
0.0540
0.0540
0.4910
0.0540

0.2769
0.2769
0.2769
0.2769
0.2769

0.3840
0.3840
0.3840
0.3840
0.3840

1.0000
0.5075
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Attack Scenario

Step 7 Project Files
Vulnerable WinCC
Print Spooler
Server Service
Network Shares

Overall
Probablity of
Adversary
Success

0.3960
0.2975
0.3414
0.4137
0.3414

The IA controls which influenced the success of the five attack scenarios are listed in
Table 18. For the specific implementation at the WPAFB fuels operation, these 16 IA controls
influence the success of the five attack scenarios.
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Table 18. IA Controls Influential in Securing against Remote Cyber Attack
Management Controls
Risk Assessment
System and Service Acquisition
Certification, Accreditation, and Security
Assessments
Operational Controls
Configuration Management
System and Information Integrity
Malicious Code Detection
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Patch Management
Incident Response
Awareness and Training
Technical Controls
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
Web Servers
Dial-up Modems
Audit and Accountability

Risk Level Matrix
The responses from Part III – Impact Category Refinement of the survey and the
probability of adversary success from the attack trees of the five attack scenarios were combined
into the Risk Level Matrix, Figure 14. In the matrix, all of the risk values lie in the mediummedium area of the graph except attack #1, which falls into the high-medium area. The IA
controls associated with the actions of all the attack scenarios have very little variation, so it is
difficult to draw meaningful information about the significance of IA controls from this Risk
Level Matrix. In order draw a meaningful result, it is necessary to break the attack scenarios
apart into the major sub-trees in a modified risk level matrix.
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Figure 14. Risk Level Matrix

The probabilities of the major sub-trees of the attack scenarios were graphed separately in
Figure 15. Modified Risk Level Matrix.
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Figure 15. Modified Risk Level Matrix

When broken into its constituent parts, there is much variability in the probability of
adversary success values of the major sub-trees. Also, some of the actions are not possible for
the victim to defend against. For instance, the select exploit sub-tree has a very low probability
of adversary success, but provides no data regarding the strength of IA controls. There are no IA
controls that affect the adversary in this case because all of the actions the adversary takes are
separate from the target network and organization. For the sub-trees that do have IA controls
associated with them, the lower the probability of adversary success, the more significant the IA
control is to defending the system. The tasks and IA controls that fall into the low portion of the
risk level matrix are the most significant in defending the system. In Figure 15, the area shaded
in green contains the major sub-trees that contain the most influential IA controls. The gain
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access and deploy exploit are the only sub-trees that fall within the low area on the Modified
Risk Matrix, see Figure 16.

Figure 16. Gain Access and Deploy Exploit major sub-trees

The 14 most influential IA controls in securing the fuels SCADA system against a Stuxnetlike attack are listed in Table 19. Most Influential IA Controls.
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Table 19. Most Influential IA Controls

Management Controls
Risk Assessment
Certification, Accreditation, and
Security Assessments
System and Service Acquisition
Operational Controls
Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Incident Response
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Malicious Code Detection
Patch Management
System and Information Integrity
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented an analysis of the data collected in the WPAFB fuels operations
SMEs survey. It then examined the probability of adversary success of the five specific attack
scenarios. These two sets of values were then combined to create the X and Y axis of the risk
level matrix. The risk matrix was then analyzed to determine the most influential IA controls in
securing the SCADA system. The next chapter describes conclusions and recommendations for
future work.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
This research provided insight into which IA controls are most significant for network
defenders and SCADA systems managers/operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of
critical infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit. An attack tree was built based on the
WPAFB fuels operation. The attack tree was populated with IA controls which were then
associated with leaf node actions. System security effectiveness values and the probability of
attack success was determined for each leaf node and applied to the attack tree. The overall
probability of adversary success for the five specific attack scenarios were determined using
SecureITree software. The incidents associated with the five specific attack scenarios were rated
by AF fuels operation SMEs. Finally, the probability of adversary success and SME impact
were incorporated into a risk level matrix. The risk level matrix provided additional insight into
the most significant IA controls.
All actions in the attack tree are not necessary to achieve a successful attack. Certain sets
of leaf node actions are more significant to achieving success than others. The probability of
success of a critical sub-tree of a cyber attack is a significant indicator of the overall probability
of adversary success. A critical sub-tree with a low probability of success was the limiting factor
of the five specific attack scenarios. Barring physical access or insider assistance/knowledge, a
cyber attack is not possible without the exploitation of a vulnerability, therefore the IA controls
that deal with preventing an attacker from gaining access are very significant to the security of
the SCADA system. This research shows that the key actions of a remote cyber attack is gaining
access to the target computer via the exploitation of a vulnerability and deploying malicious
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code. The IA controls associated with these leaf node actions are the most influential IA
controls.
The results of this study are useful for managers who make the ultimate decision on
which IA controls provide the greatest return on investment in securing a SCADA system. If an
organization cannot implement all of the IA controls, they should focus on controls listed in
Table 20. in order to protect against a Stuxnet-like cyber attack.
Table 20. Most influential IA Controls

Management Controls
Risk Assessment
Certification, Accreditation, and
Security Assessments
System and Service Acquisition
Operational Controls
Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Incident Response
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Malicious Code Detection
Patch Management
System and Information Integrity
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
The IA controls have been designed primarily to address IT systems security issues.
SCADA systems are slowly transitioning toward IT-like systems, but the move has not fully
occurred. Caution is warranted when introducing these solutions to a SCADA environment and
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they may need to be specially trailed in order to work properly (Stouffer et al., 2008). Therefore
the operational reality facing SCADA operators makes implementation of a number of the most
influential IA controls listed in Table 20 problematic. SCADA operators are less likely to fully
implement patch management, role-based access controls, malicious code detection, and
intrusion detection and prevention. According to a number of ICS security assessment
conducted by DHS (2009), poor patch management and weak authentication were among the top
ICS software vulnerabilities observed. This indicates that SCADA operators are less inclined to
implement proper patch management and role-based access controls. Furthermore, there is
concern that the malicious code detection IA control will cause latency due to computational
overhead affecting the real-time performance of SCADA systems. Also, that updating virus
signatures further exposes the SCADA system to attacks from the Internet (Krutz, 2006).
Finally, it is unlikely the intrusion detection and prevention IA control will be implemented in an
effective manner because most IDS‟ are not capable of monitoring SCADA protocols for
suspicious behaviors (Stamp, Campbell, Depoy, Dillinger & Young, 2004).
The research methodology applied in this study is a sound approach to identify which IA
controls are most influential to SCADA system security. The methodology partially addresses
the future work described by Igure (2007) to find relative risks of the various vulnerabilities of
the system. The methodology also incorporates factors called for by Byres et al. (2004) to use an
attack tree to aggregate subordinate node values and site specific parameters such as known
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. In Mendezllovet‟s (2010) research in codifying IA controls
for DOD SCADA systems, there was perfect agreement among survey respondents that
certification and accreditation was ranked last as an effective IA control. They also ranked
encryption as a high technical control. He suspected there is a disconnect in how the CE and IT
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communities view the relative importance of these controls. This research shows that
certification and accreditation is important in defending against a cyber attack. Similarly,
encryption was not found to be a significant IA control in defending against a cyber attack. This
study shows evidence supporting his suspicion of a disconnect of the ranking of IA controls
within the IT and CE communities.
Recommendations for Future Research
Based on known limitations and current constraints, four extensions of this study are
proposed. One potential extension of this research is to conduct research on a SCADA operation
where the AIS is more tightly integrated into the physical control mechanisms of the operation.
An examination of such an operation might produce a greater range of risk and may include the
IA controls that were not included in this study. Also, as a related item, a metric that describes
the degree to which a SCADA system is coupled into the physical infrastructure could be
developed.
A second research option is to focus on the remote aspects of other cyber attacks. There
is an opportunity to apply other known cyber exploits in a similar manner using the same
methodology. Additionally, the study of physical access components of an attack would show
which IA controls are most significant to physical security.
A third extension is to take the attack tree developed in this research and refine it by
including a source of data to more objectively assign values to both the system security
effectiveness and the probability of attack success. Also, the addition of more technical details
may answer technical issues related to securing SCADA systems.
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Finally, another researcher could take the results and extend them to fuels operations
across the DOD or other critical infrastructures. The inclusion of commercial industry,
proprietary data would assist in extrapolating to a more general case.
Summary
This research showed which IA controls are most influential for network defenders and
SCADA system managers and operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of critical
infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit. Since this attack vector is the most advanced
exploit found to date against critical infrastructure, this research is timely and relevant in
identifying the critical IA controls which are most effective in preventing a successful attack.
Just as significant the methodology used in this research is a sound approach to answering
questions about system security. It provides a broadly applicable and flexible framework to
answer other systems security questions for both IT and SCADA systems with only minor
modification.
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Appendix A: Roles and Responsibilities of SectorSpecific Federal Agencies (Bush, 2003)

Federal Agency
Department of Agriculture

Sector
Agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products)

Public health, healthcare, and food (other
than meat, poultry, egg products)
Environmental Protection Agency Drinking water and water treatment systems
Energy, including the production refining,
storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and
Department of Energy
electric power except for commercial nuclear
power facilities
Banking and finance
Department of the Treasury
National monuments and icons
Department of the Interior
Defense industrial base
Department of Defense
Health and Human Services
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Appendix B: Base Stuxnet Attack Tree

Page 1 of 5
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Page 2 of 5
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Page 3 of 5
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Page 5 of 5
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Appendix C: Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree

Page 1 of 4
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Page 2 of 4
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Page 3 of 4
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Page 4 of 4
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Appendix D: Five Chosen Attack Scenarios
Step 7 Project Files Attack Scenario

Page 1 of 3
92

Page 2 of 3
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Page 3 of 3
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WinCC Attack Scenario

Page 1 of 3
95

Page 2 of 3
96

Page 3 of 3
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Print Spooler Attack Scenario

Page 1 of 3
98

Page 2 of 3
99

Page 3 of 3
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Server Service Attack Scenario

Page 1 of 3
101

Page 2 of 3

102

Page 3 of 3
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Network Shares Attack Scenario

Page 1 of 3
104

Page 2 of 3
105

Page 3 of 3
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Appendix E: Summary of Indicator Values
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Appendix F: Leaf Node, Effect Mapping
Network Device Leaf Node

Stuxnet vulnerability Leaf node

Exploit vulnerable application

Step 7 Project files

Exploit vulnerable application

Exploit Vulnerable WinCC

Exploit vulnerable Windows
XP Operating System

Exploit Print Spooler vulnerability

Network Server

Exploit vulnerable Server Service

Network Server

Exploit Vulnerable Network
Shares
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Effect
Alter Fuels Manager Defense
(FMD) database data
Alter FMD real time HumanMachine Interface (HMI) data
Cause the computer hard
drive where FMD resides to
crash
Transmit a false report to the
Fuels Enterprise System
Disrupt FMD
Communications

Percent “Very” or “Somewhat”
Effective

2010

Statefull firewalls

86%

Electronic access control systems

82%

Access controls

80%

Password complexity

79%

Encryption

76%

Heuristics-based SPAM filtering

74%

Application layer firewalls

71%

Host-based firewalls

68%

Network-based antivirus

68%

Identity management Systems

67%

Network IDS/IPS
Policy-based network connections &
enforcement

66%

RBL-based SPAM filtering

66%

Surveillance

66%

Wireless encryption/ protection

66%

Automated patch management

65%

Host-based antivirus

63%

Badging
Change control/configuration
management systems

62%

Network-based policy enforcement

62%

Rights management

62%

Multi-factor/strong authentication

61%

Network access control (NAC)

60%

Role-based authentication

57%

Host-based policy-enforcement

56%

Application configuration monitoring

53%

0.65

0.59
0.57

0.51
0.50
0.50

0.50

0.50
66%
0.50

0.50
0.50

0.50
0.49

0.49

0.47
0.47
0.47

62%

0.46

0.46
0.43

0.40 0.40

- Denotes Sys tem Secrui ty Effecti venes s va l ue for pa rti cul a r IA control

Page 1 of 3
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0.50

Virtual Private Network

Encryption

Audit and Accountability

Wireless

Dial-up Modems

Virtual Local Area Network

Web Servers

Role-Based Access Control

Physical Token Authentication

Password Authentication

Identification and Authentication

Technical Controls

Awareness and Training

Incident Response

Media Protection

Patch Management

Intrusion Detection and Prevention

Malicious Code Detection

System and Information Integrity

Configuration Management

Disaster Recovery Planning

Contingency Planning

Cabling

Portable Devices

Control Center/Control Room

Physical and Environmental Protection

Personnel Security

Operational Controls

Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments

System and Service Acquisition

Planning

Management Controls

How effective do you consider
each of the following
technologies in place at your
organization in detecting and/
or countering security events?
(Scale: Very effective, Somewhat
effective, Not very effective, Not
at all effective, Don’t know, Not
applicable-don’t use) (Base:
experienced a cyber security
event during the past 12
months)

Risk Assessment

Appendix G: System Security Effectiveness Values

Percent “Very” or “Somewhat”
Effective

2010

Host-based IDS/ IPS

53%

Manual patch management

53%

Host-based SPAM
Network-based
monitoring/forensics/ESM tool
Software development tools (&
processes)

51%

Host based anti-SPAM

47%

Data tracking
Host base configuration
management/change control

46%

Application monitoring & trending

44%

Digital signatures

43%

One-time passwords

43%

Wireless monitoring

41%

0.40
0.40
0.38

51%
###
50%
0.35

0.35

0.34
45%

Data loss prevention (DLP) tools

39%

Application signing

38%

Automated integrity controls

38%

Anomaly detection system

32%

Biometrics

30%

Keystroke monitoring

24%

0.33

0.33
0.32
0.32

0.32

0.31

0.31
0.29
0.29

0.24

0.29
0.24
0.23
0.18

=(Percent “Very” or “Somewhat” Effective) * .75
Survey percetnages are multiplied by .75 consistent with the mid value between very effective and somwhat effective per the scale below.
Security System effectiveness
1. Very effective (value .9)
2. Somewhat Effective (value .6)
3. Not very effective (value .3)
4. Ineffective (value .1)
5. Not applicable (value 0)
- Denotes Sys tem Secrui ty Effecti venes s va l ue for pa rti cul a r IA control

Page 2 of 3
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Virtual Private Network

Encryption

Audit and Accountability

Wireless

Dial-up Modems

Virtual Local Area Network

Web Servers

Role-Based Access Control

Physical Token Authentication

Password Authentication

Identification and Authentication

Technical Controls

Awareness and Training

Incident Response

Media Protection

Patch Management

Intrusion Detection and Prevention

Malicious Code Detection

System and Information Integrity

Configuration Management

Disaster Recovery Planning

Contingency Planning

Cabling

Portable Devices

Control Center/Control Room

Physical and Environmental Protection

Personnel Security

Operational Controls

Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments

System and Service Acquisition

Planning

Risk Assessment

Management Controls

How effective do you consider
each of the following
technologies in place at your
organization in detecting and/
or countering security events?
(Scale: Very effective, Somewhat
effective, Not very effective, Not
at all effective, Don’t know, Not
applicable-don’t use) (Base:
experienced a cyber security
event during the past 12
months)

IA Control
Management Controls
Planning
System and Service Acquisition
Risk Assessment
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments
Operational Controls
Malicious Code Detection
Physical and Environmental Protection
Portable Devices
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Incident Response
Patch Management
Personnel Security
Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
System and Information Integrity
Control Center/Control Room
Media Protection
Disaster Recovery Planning
Cabling
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability
Password Authentication
Encryption
Identification and Authentication
Wireless
Virtual Private Network
Physical Token Authentication
Web Servers
Role-Based Access Control
Virtual Local Area Network
Dial-up Modems

* Values on Items in blue are extrapolated
from Mendezlovett's (2010) work in ranking
IA controls.

Page 3 of 3
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System Secuirty Effectivness
value (E)
0.5
0.38
0.33
0.2

*(4 of 4)

0.51
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.49
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.44
0.4
0.38
0.34
0.29
0.15

*(8 of 15)

0.65
0.59
0.57
0.5
0.5
0.48
0.46
0.45
0.43
0.38
0.32

*(6 of 11)

*(10 of 15)

*(13 of 15)
*(15 of 15)

*(8 of 11)
*(10 of 11)

Appendix H: Probability of Attack Success Matrix

Probability of
Adversary Success
for each Leaf Node

E values ->

Gain authorized entry to base
Breech Fuels Operations
Compound Perimeter
Avoid Detection

Gain Access to Alternate Site
Enter Fuels Control Center
Enter through Fuels Operations
Gate
Gain unauthorized entry to
base

Create System Admin Account
Escalate Privileges
Get Accomplice
Crack Password File
Extract Password File

0.10

0.50
0.50

0.50

0.10
0.10
0.50
0.50
0.10

Prob of
Attack
Success

Break into Fuels Control Center
Exploit Vulnerable Network
server
Exploit vulnerable Application
Exploit vulnerable Windows XP
Operating System

0.90
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.10
0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50
0.10
0.10

0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.90

0.50
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.50
0.90
0.90

0.50
0.90

0.33

0.50

0.38

0.20

Certification, Accreditation, and Security
Assessments

0.07
0.07
0.07

0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07

0.60
0.60

0.60

0.56
0.56

0.72

0.72

0.08
0.08

System and Service Acquisition
0.06

Planning

0.34

Risk Assessment
0.60
0.34
0.60

0.27

0.27
0.27

0.47

0.25

0.25

0.25

0.25
0.25

0.50

0.31

0.38

0.50

0.15

0.44

Contingency Planning
0.29

Disaster Recovery Planning

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.25
0.25

Cabling

0.31

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.28

0.28

0.27

0.25

Portable Devices
0.43

0.27
0.27

Control Center/Control Room
0.31

0.27

Physical and Environmental Protection

0.45

Personnel Security
0.27

0.47

0.40

0.05

0.51

0.05

0.50

0.49

0.34

0.50

0.47

0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28

0.05

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.45

0.05

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.33

0.33
0.33

0.05

0.05
0.05

0.06

Awareness and Training

0.05

Incident Response

0.06

Media Protection

0.27
0.05
0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

Patch Management
0.33

Intrusion Detection and Prevention
0.05
0.05

Malicious Code Detection
0.05
0.05

System and Information Integrity

0.45

Configuration Management

0.25

0.50

0.59

0.46

0.43

0.45

0.38

Virtual Local Area Network

0.32

Dial-up Modems

0.50

Wireless

0.65

Audit and Accountability

0.57

Encryption

0.48

Virtual Private Network
0.27

0.05

0.45

0.04

0.04
0.04

0.04

Web Servers
0.06

0.05

Role-Based Access Control

0.25

Physical Token Authentication
0.27

Password Authentication

0.61

Identification and Authentication

0.50

Average (Prob
of Adversary
Success)

0.054
0.054
0.265
0.500
0.048

0.261
0.302

0.301

0.258

0.258

0.313
0.260

0.312

0.056
0.056

0.056

0.050
0.049

0.056

0.056

0.056

0.056

0.056
0.100
0.100
0.623

0.556
0.280
0.280
0.280
0.280
0.280
0.280
0.287
0.034
0.293

0.280
0.603
0.750
0.750
0.549
0.335
0.603

0.450

0.500
0.450

0.250
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Leaf Node

Exploit Wireless Access Point
Disable Antivirus
Exploit vulnerable Network
Shares
Exploit Vulnerable Step 7
Project Files
Exploit Vulnerable Win CC
Database files
Exploit Print Spooler
vulnerability
Exploit vulnerable Server
service
Obtain Stuxnet like Exploit
Create Stuxnet like Exploit
War Dialing for modems
Scanning for wireless access
points
Network sweep
Network Trace
Port Scan
OS Fingerprinting
Version Scan
Vulnerability Scan
Dumpster Diving
Social Engineering
Physical Surveillance

0.50

Page 1 of 2

0.50
0.50

Physical Theft of Backup media
Internet Search
Phone book
Public Documents
Target Website
Web based recon tools
Whois databse
Issue commands to implanted
exploit
Select Application level, UserMode, or Kernel Mode
Persistent access
Verify successful install
Issue commands to Persistent
access

Management Controls

Operational Controls

Technical Controls

Probability of
Adversary Success
for each Leaf Node

0.10

0.10

0.50
0.10
0.50
0.10

0.33

0.50

Planning
0.38

System and Service Acquisition
0.20

0.50

0.15

0.44

0.29

0.47

0.40

0.51

0.50

0.49

0.34

0.50

0.47

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.59
0.59

0.38

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.44
0.44

0.50

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.54
0.54

0.44

0.47

0.54

0.05

0.05

Awareness and Training
0.05

Incident Response
0.05

Media Protection

0.06

Patch Management

0.06

Intrusion Detection and Prevention
0.25

Malicious Code Detection
0.25

System and Information Integrity
0.30

Configuration Management

0.05

Disaster Recovery Planning

0.05

Contingency Planning

0.06

Cabling

0.05

Portable Devices

0.25

Control Center/Control Room

0.25

Physical and Environmental Protection

0.30

Personnel Security

0.25
0.25
0.25

0.50

0.59

0.46

Physical Token Authentication

0.43

Role-Based Access Control

0.45

Web Servers

0.38

Virtual Local Area Network

0.32

Dial-up Modems

0.50

Wireless

0.65

Audit and Accountability

0.57

Encryption

0.48

Virtual Private Network
0.29

0.29
0.29
0.29

Password Authentication

0.18
0.18
0.18

0.18

Identification and Authentication

0.29
0.29
0.29
0.29

Average (Prob
of Adversary
Success)

0.270
0.270
0.270
0.525
0.525

0.491

0.054

0.041

1.000
0.750

0.265
0.053
0.285
0.053

0.750
0.500
0.175
0.270
0.237
0.237
0.237
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E values ->

Leaf Node
Install Rootkit
Install Backdoor
Install Trojan Horse
Upload exploit via DVD
Upload exploit via USB
Upload exploit via persistent
access
Upload exploit via Phishing Email
Upload exploit via Malicious
Website

1.00
0.90

Prob of
Attack
Success
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.90
0.90

Automated Execution of Exploit
through site conditions
Send execute command

0.90
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50

0.90

Establish connection to exploit
Delete Shell history
Hide exploit related files
Upload tools to cover tracks
Delete tools used to cover
tracks
Test Covert Channel
Generate Bogus Log files
Install Covert Channel
Erase Security Logs
Erase Application Logs
Erase System Logs

Page 2 of 2

Risk Assessment

Certification, Accreditation, and Security
Assessments
Operational Controls

* - IA Controls in Red are not part of the fuels flight implmentation
** - IA Controls in Yellow are part of the Fuels flight implementation,
but either do not apprecialby impact on cyber leaf node actions, or
impact physical leaf node actions.

Management Controls

Technical Controls

Appendix I: Survey Instrument

Incident Impact Rating of Fuels Operators
Primary Investigators: Maj Jeffrey Hemmes and Mr. J. Lopez Jr.
Student Researcher: Maj Jason R. Nielsen
Research Institution: Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio.
Research Sponsor: HQ USAF A4/7
Purpose: Collect impact ratings for specific incidents affecting DoD Fuels Operations.
Background: This research effort seeks to discover which Information Assurance (IA) controls
are most influential for defending the networked Fuels industrial control systems against a
specific cyber attack. By examining the success probability of specific attack vectors along with
the impact of potential incidents, an overall risk metric can be calculated. This survey requests
Air Force Fuels SMEs to provide an impact rating to specific cyber incidents that could impact
the operational mission of a Fuels Management organization.
The survey is organized into three parts: (1) Demographics, (2) Impact rating and
(3) Impact category refinement.
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PART I - Demographics:
1. How many years of experience in operating or managing Fuels Industrial Control Systems do
you have? (round values up, place an X next to only one)
___ 1-5 years
___ 6-10 years
___ 11-15 years
___16-20 years
___ More than 21 years
2. List all computer security or network security training you have completed in the last 5 years.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
3. List all industry certifications you have successfully completed in the last 5 years.
(e.g. Quality Assurance Certification, Project Management Professional, Security+)
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
4. What is your primary affiliation with the government? (place an X next to only one)
___ Contractor
___ Military (Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty)
___ Civil Service employee
___ Other (Describe) _______________________________
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PART II – Impact Rating:
Instructions: This portion of the survey will ask you to rate the impact magnitude of various
incidents on the Fuels mission according to the definitions provided in Table 1. Read through
Table 1 before proceeding.
Table 1. Magnitude of Impact Definitions (source: NIST SP 800-30)
Magnitude
of
Impact

Impact Definition

Exercise of the vulnerability:
(1) May result in the highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources;

High

(2) May significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation,
or interest; or
(3) May result in human death or serious injury.
Exercise of the vulnerability:
(1) May result in the costly loss of tangible assets or resources;

Medium

(2) May violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest;
or
(3) May result in human injury.
Exercise of the vulnerability:

Low

(1) May result in the loss of some tangible assets or resources or
(2) May noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest.

Note: You can make the following assumptions when determining the impact ratings:
1. The incidents are listed in random order.
2. The incidents are mutually exclusive events.
3. Only one incident can occur at a time.
4. An incident is considered a singular event, meaning they can only occur once.
5. One incident will not cause another event to occur.
Please proceed to the next page to provide impact ratings.
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Instructions: Provide your response in the “Impact Rating” column for each incident listed in
table 2 below. Select only one impact rating for each incident (e.g. Low, Medium, or High)
according to the definitions provided in table 1.

Table 2. Mission Impact Rating
Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission

Impact Rating
(Low, Med, High)

Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data
(For
example - change status of training for personnel, change status of
fuel truck maintenance, alter fuel temperature conversion
calculation, falsify report from lab, cause billing errors, cause errors in
fuels inventory)
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data
(For example - change visual indicator of tank fuel level)
Cause the computer hard drive where FMD resides to crash
(For example – cause non-recoverable computer hard drive crash)
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System
Disrupt FMD Communications
(For example
– prevent in-bound and out-bound FMD communications with
external systems)
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PART III – Impact Category Refinement:
Instructions: For each incident ranked L, M, or H in Part II, give it a numeric score
within the defined range. Scores should take into account all other events that can occur
in that magnitude of impact category. Assign scores using the following guidelines:
Low impact (1 to 10), Medium impact (11 to 50), High impact (51 to 100). Refer back
to Part II as needed for the rank (L,M,H) you assigned.
Examples:
Low impact: At the post office the impact of running out of “forever”
stamps is low. So the score must fall within 1 to 10. Other incidents that
have a low impact include long wait times (2), customer complaints (1),
and a new federal holiday (3). Among all of the possible low impact
incidents, running out of forever stamps scores 5.
Medium impact: At the post office the impact of a broken mail sorting
machine is medium. So the score must fall between 11 and 50. Other
incidents that have a medium impact include postal employee calling in
sick (20), snow storm (40), and a mail truck in maintenance depot (25).
Among all of the possible medium impact incidents, a broken mail sorting
machine scores 30.
High impact: At the post office the impact of the roof caving in high. So
the score must fall within 51 to 100. Other incidents that have a high
impact include a phoned-in bomb threat (80), power outage (75), and a
point of sale outage (55). Among all of the possible high impact incidents,
the roof caving in scores 70.

Score the following - Low (1 to 10); Medium (11 to 50); High (51 to 100):
Mission Impacting Rating Refinement
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data

Score

Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data
Cause the computer hard drive where FMD resides to crash
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System
Disrupt FMD Communications

Thank you for your participation in this survey. If you have any follow-on questions you
can contact Maj Jason Nielsen at (318) 834-6662 or Mr. Lopez at (937) 255-6565 at
extension 4637. If this survey was E-mailed to you, please E-mail it back attached to a
signed E-mail to jason.nielsen@afit.edu.

Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human
subjects
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